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Introduction
During early 1990s many developing countries initiated liberalization,
privatization and deregulation reforms. The context and nature of reforms
were country specific, but there was a common premise that the market
system can enhance economic efficiency, spur growth and increase
consumer welfare. There was “consensus” among policy makers that
government owned businesses not only are less efficient but they also utilize
scarce public resources1. In order to save tax money and improve
performance of state owned businesses, the policy makers ventured to either
privatize the state owned enterprises or restructure these organizations in the
first stage and then subject businesses to regulation, before privatizing these
entities at latter stage. The liberalization reforms allowed entry for new
businesses that changed the competitive structure of the corresponding
industries. In this thesis I have analysed specific aspects of the policy
reforms started in Pakistan in the 1990s and discussed their fallout on the
electricity and banking industry of Pakistan. There are three chapters in the
thesis; Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 cover issues in the electricity industry, while
Chapter 3 documents price-concentration relationship in post reform
banking industry. The positive analysis documents the economic
1 Privatization of State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) is one of the important conditions of
International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout programs received by successive Pakistani
Governments over the years.
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performance, nature of competition, industry structure and regulation issues
in the electricity and banking industries, while policy options are discussed
and major lessons are drawn in light of positive analysis where possible.
Understanding functioning of markets and related supply-side issues
is at the heart of industrial organization. The supply side constraints in
developing economies partly results from limited private sector investment
and lack of availability of the supportive infrastructure for the private
enterprise and economic growth (World Bank, 1997). According to
UNCTAD2, poor infrastructure, and lack of support services are among the
main supply-side constraints facing firms in the developing countries. The
role of basic infrastructure and regulatory institutions for sustained
economic growth and private sector development is well documented in
academic literature and policy documents (World Bank, 1997). The basic
infrastructure which includes transportation, energy, water supply, and
financial services is essential for sustained growth and poverty reduction. In
this context, electricity and financial services fall into the supportive
infrastructure that can be supplied by public or private firms but is essential
for the well-functioning of a wide range of production activities in the
economy. The banking industry including and the electricity industry are
subject to government regulations in Pakistan. The regulatory authorities
2 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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control these two industries through quality, price and entry regulation.
Therefore the analysis of electricity and banking industries require
documentation of the regulatory framework in place and the consequences
on market based reforms in the electricity industry.
The choice of industries for this thesis requires some considerations,
the electricity industry has been under reforms since the 1990s with the
objective to transform the industry from a state owned monopoly to market
based firms either working in public sector or to be privatized at some stage.
After more than two decades of reforms there is still no clarity of status of
reforms and the electricity industry in Pakistan is in chaos, pervasive
shortage of the power supply and the overall system losses are beyond
comparable international industry standards. The research agenda in this
thesis is to unpack the issues in the electricity industry and highlight the
sources of economic inefficiency and constraints in the process of market
based reforms. The research questions addressed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2
are related to the electricity industry and are fundamental in nature and
important for the understanding of the industry. Apart from policy and
regulatory reports, there is limited research available to understand key
parameters of the electricity industry in Pakistan, the research conducted
here will bridge that gap in literature and highlight areas of further research.
The electricity industry in Pakistan is an interesting and puzzling
area for economics research as there have been reforms which have serious
xiv
consequences for the economy and welfare of consumers3. Chapter 1
documents that reforms occurred in the sense that businesses in the
electricity supply chain are unbundled with separate entities for generation,
transmission, and distribution4, however reforms are not obvious as the
unbundled state owned electricity businesses operate without any
contractual separation in financial and administrative liabilities and
performance monitoring. The industry is still a state owned monopoly in a
large part of Pakistan5, with central government supplying continuous large
subsidies to finance power purchase, pay debts and sustain the operation
expenses of unbundled entities and determine effective electricity tariffs for
end consumers. The inability of power supply companies to finance power
purchase has resulted in financial chaos, routine long outages (including
outages in main urban centres), under investment in new technology and
lack of maintenance of current physical stock.
Further, Chapter 1 tries to unpack some of the issues in network
segments of the electricity industry. The case study analysed in Chapter 1
covers details of the industry including diseconomies of monopoly network
structures, resulting in lower average tariff than average cost and failure or
success of regulatory framework. This chapter also comments on future
3 In terms of increased blackout periods over the years and rising electricity prices over the years
4 Distribution and retail businesses are performed by same business unit
5 Electricity in greater Karachi region is supplied by privatized Karachi Electricity Supply Company
(KESC)
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reforms and the structure of the electricity market, in light of the analysis
conducted in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 is a specific study that measures
economic efficiency through estimating cost functions for power generation
plants. Chapter 2 compares public power plants with private power plants
and finds that performance differential exists across plants according to
ownership of plants. The utility owned government plants are technically
and economically less efficient than privately owned non-utility plants. This
chapter argues that merit order and fuel allocation to power plants should be
based on economic efficiency.
On the other hand, liberalization and privatization reforms took a
faster pace in the banking industry, a number of state owned large banks
were privatized during the 1990s and licences were issued too many new
private financial institutions. The banking regulation quality increased
substantially and the industry conforms to international banking regulation
standards, new entry and reforms in the banking industry have changed
market structure substantially. In Chapter 3, market outcome data for loans
is constructed to estimate the price concentration relationship for the
banking industry in Pakistan. The estimated results shows that banks in
more concentrated markets charge higher interest on loans compared to
markets with a larger number of banks. The data set constructed in Chapter
3 is of potential use for further research, and can be employed to estimate
xvi
the impact of exogenous shocks and policy changes on corporate lending in
Pakistan.
11 Structure and Regulation of Electricity Networks in
Pakistan
1.1 Introduction
This chapter is a case study of the network part of the electricity
industry in Pakistan, particularly in the context of structural and regulatory
reforms started in the 1990s. Published reports by the regulator show that
the reforms process is not going anywhere even after two decades and the
industry is performing poorly (NEPRA, 2010). The market is not clearing as
load demand is higher than total system supply, particularly during the
summer season6. There is no electricity due to load shedding for long hours
in major parts of the distribution networks during the hot and long summer
period. An effort is made here to document the basic facts of industry in an
orderly manner and to draw major lessons from the failure of the reforms
process and poor functioning of the electricity market. The focus will be on
network segments of the electricity supply chain and issues in the regulation
of the electricity industry, the restructuring of these natural monopoly
components of industry will be discussed in detail.
6 There are no official figures available on load shedding hours. The summer seasons runs
from March to October in most parts of the country.
2The electricity industry in Pakistan is quite under researched (GOP,
2013), the main source of industry knowledge is based on government
publications. According to available research (NEPRA 2011, Afia M, 2007),
the rich information available in policy documents and regulatory reports
has not been analysed in detail. Therefore, documenting basic industry facts
and understanding related issues in this chapter is the main contribution to
the existing literature and will be useful for future policy reforms.
The electricity industry in Pakistan has been functioning as a state
monopoly for a long time. The state monopoly includes two vertically
integrated electric utilities in the country; the Water and Power
Development Authority (WAPDA) with a customer base of 20.3 million and
the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) serving 2.1 million
customers7. In the last two decades, two major changes have occurred in the
electricity industry of Pakistan. Firstly, the two state owned utilities went
under structural reforms and unbundling in 2002. Second, regulation of the
electricity industry started in 1998 and an authority was put in place to
regulate electricity prices, allow entry into the industry and set standards for
the electricity supply. The reforms were motivated by the intuition that state
owned monopolies were less efficient than private enterprise and there was
need to either privatize or restructure state entities. The unbundling process
7 In the year 2011, 90 % generation (91,663 GW h) was in WAPDA system while 10 %
(10,036GW h) in KESC system (NEPRA 2011).
3included separation of the potentially competitive segment (i.e. power
generation) from the network based natural monopoly part of the electricity
industry (i.e. transmission, and distribution of power), and division of the
natural monopoly part of industry into transmission and distribution
networks. The network components of industry are subject to regulation,
and distribution utilities also perform as retail electricity suppliers.
The restructuring plan for the state-owned power sector was
approved by the government of Pakistan in 1992, however the first
substantial change in the industry was the commissioning of independent
power producers (IPPs) in 1994. The IPPs started supplying electricity to
the system in the late 1990s, and this was followed by privatization of a
public power plant in 1996. These early initiatives created political debate
and legal disputes between government and IPPs due to the lack of
transparency in contractual arrangements and no obvious change in the
competitive structure of the generation segment.
The regulation of the industry started in 1998 when the National
Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was put in place to regulate
price, quality, and entry in the industry. NEPRA issued licences to 9
distribution companies (DISCOs) in 2002, including 8 companies in the
WAPDA areas. A licence was also issued to the National Transmission and
4Dispatch Company (NTDC)8 for the transmission business in the WAPDA
system. The 8 distribution companies and the NTDC are working as
government owned monopolies in the distribution and transmission network
of WAPDA, structure of the industry is presented in Figure 1.1.
The electricity industry in Pakistan is plagued by financial and
operational issues which are affecting the economic efficiency and growth
of the industry (GOP, 2013). The distribution companies and the
transmission company receive payments from government subsidies9, 1,290
billion Rupees10 have been transferred as subsidies to DISCOs from 2007 to
2012 (GOP, 2013). The regulator decides the electricity price for each utility
(i.e. a DISCO) after taking into account the consumer mix, transmission
losses and operational cost of the DISCOs in accordance with the tariff
standards and procedure rules (NEPR 2011). The government decides the
final electricity price, which is lower than the price determined by regulators
for most utilities. Therefore the central government does not pass all of the
production costs to consumers by charging less than the tariffs determined
8 This chapter covers transmission and distribution networks of WAPDA system, KESC is
a vertically integrated company operational in the greater Karachi region (with no effective
separate cost centres) and issues related to KESC might need a different framework for
discussion. However, possible experiment can be done to compare performance of KESC
with government owned distribution companies.
9 The issues related to network part of the industry are discussed here in detail, as the focus
is on the distribution and transmission segments of the industry in WAPDA/NTDC system.
10 about 18 billion US dollars
5by the regulator11 to promote economic development. The government
introduced price differential subsidies in order to pursue the policy of
uniform electricity prices in the country. In this way the performance
incentives for firms in power networks can be partially determined by the
subsidy allocation mechanism and regulatory tariff structure.
The main objective of this chapter is to present an account of the
network part of the electricity industry and analyse the transition from state
monopoly to a regulated state monopoly. An effort is made to highlight the
factors which are potentially slowing growth of the industry and resulting in
poor allocation of resources. The documentation of technical, economic, and
institutional factors related to transmission and distribution segments is an
integral part of understanding market functioning and incentive structure in
the electricity industry (Joskow and Schmalensee 1983)12. The economic
efficiency in the electricity industry also depends on the contractual nature
and consequent incentives in network economy, and the tariff incentive
structure applicable to utilities (DISCOs) and system operator (NTDC). The
current tariff structure and evolution to its current state is discussed here,
with respect to corresponding implications on incentives for firms in the
business of electricity networks.
11 Government documents show that electricity sale price for all utilities is equal to the
lowest determined price for any utility (among all utilities) for a given year (GOP, 2013)
12 Chapter 2 discusses issues in generation sector in detail.
6The electricity networks are an important component of the
electricity industry, efficient functioning of transmission and distribution
companies and timely capital investment in distribution networks is required
for the growth of other segments of the industry. For instance, the power
generation segment performance will depend on the reliability and structure
of the transmission and distribution networks. The missing interconnection
of transmission networks or inadequate capacity in the networks affects the
operation of existing power plants and has delayed the commissioning of
new power generation plants (NEPRA, 2010).
The analysis of incentive mechanism for the electricity networks
assumes the separation of network segments into clearly defined distribution
and transmission networks (Joskow, 2008). Although the unbundling of
electric power in WAPDA system occurred in 2002 with the establishment
of distribution companies DISCOs and transmission company NTDC,
however formal contractual relationships between DISCOs and NTDC are
not in place and they were under “de facto” common management until
recently (NEPRA, 2011). The role of key public institutions13 during
transition needs to be discussed in order to understand the incentive
structure and resulting behaviour of DISCOs and NTDC (see Figure 1.1 for
structure of the Industry). The electricity networks in the main system are
13 One example, Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), PEPCO’s main
responsibilities included to oversee WAPDA’s unbundling, and to restructure and to
corporatize distribution and generation public firms (NEPRA 2010)
7government owned regulated monopolies where the authority (i.e. NEPRA)
oversees the regulation and determines tariffs for power generation,
transmission, and distribution. The knowledge on regulatory effectiveness
and incentives creation by tariff structure or regulator lag is quite limited for
Pakistan (Afia M, 2007). The documentation of all the institutional details
with potential economic consequences for the electricity industry will be
useful for the future reforms of the electricity industry in Pakistan.
The following discussion in this chapter is divided into five sections,
the next section discusses issues related to the structure and management of
electricity distribution networks, the natural monopoly role of electricity
networks and its implications for economic efficiency are also analysed in
this part. The section 1.3 documents incentive regulation particularly
relevant to electricity networks and compares it with current practice in
Pakistan. The section 1.4 expands discussion to the public sector role in the
power industry particularly in electricity networks and incentive
mechanisms for market based reforms. Section 1.5 includes unbundling
reforms experience of other developing countries and documents any
implications for Pakistan. Some policy recommendations based on positive
analysis and concluding remarks are documented in the section 1.6.
Additional appendix tables are given in the section 1.7.
81.2 Structure of Electricity Networks
In this section I will discuss the implications of “electricity network”
structure on economic efficiency of the electricity systems in the context of
theoretical considerations and general practice in the electricity industry.
The distribution networks operator also plays the role of retail business in
Pakistan, the issues related to the quality of electricity supply are also
documented in this section. The structure of electricity networks is
considered as a regulated natural monopoly like gas or water supply
networks, where duplication cost can be avoided by serving a geographical
market with a single transmission or distribution company, instead of more
than one firm doing the same job (Joskow and Schmalensee 1988).
Transmission networks carry high voltage power and connect a generator to
other generators and the load centres in the system, while the distribution
networks supply electricity on low voltage to consumers and are connected
to high voltage transmission networks through boundary grid stations.
In Pakistan, government owned distribution companies DISCOs and
system operator NTDC are functioning as distribution and transmission
monopolies respectively, while government owned generation companies
(GENCOs) are competing with private power producers to supply electricity
in the system (Figure 1.1 below). This structure of industry shown in Figure
1.1 requires explanation of the past institutional context.
9Figure 1.1 The unbundled structure of the state owned monopoly
Historically, utilities in Pakistan were vertically integrated in their
generation, transmission and distribution14 businesses. Incentives for
vertical integration of distribution with generation-transmission arise due to
some basic complementarities. The distribution networks are load centres
and they provide reliable load forecast to generation and transmission firms
for the efficient function of the electricity system. The accurate load
forecasts are also necessary for short term planning and long term
investments in a generation-transmission system (Joskow and Schmalensee
1983).
The distribution and transmission networks were part of vertically
integrated state-monopoly Water and Power Development Authority
(WAPDA). As a result of WAPDA’s restructuring in 2002, the regulator
14 In Pakistan distribution companies also perform the role of electricity supplier or
retailing. In principle, a government or a private firm can run retail business by procuring
electricity and paying to intermediary firms in power supply chain. The words distribution
companies, DISCOs, and utilities are used interchangeably in this chapter for electricity
suppliers.
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issued licences to distribution companies DISCOs and transmission
company NTDC to work as unbundled natural monopolies. Further,
Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) was formed to manage the
unbundling process and to make sure that electricity networks make a
successful transition. However, centralization incentive persisted with
central government in guise of NTDC/PEPCO as the current governance
system is without any effective contractual arrangements between
distribution firms and other parts of the industry, until recently distribution
companies DISCOs were under the management of NTDC and PEPCO
(NEPRA 2010). However distribution companies DISCOs are functioning
as unbundled units and are also performing retail business in monopoly
controlled areas.
There is theoretical justification along international practice for the
natural monopoly status of distribution networks and the efforts to
“unbundle” electric utility in Pakistan were in line with the international
experience. The electricity unbundling initiative started in the US in 1980s
and a number of countries, including the UK have “unbundled” electricity
supply. According to the basic model, the network part of industry became a
natural monopoly while power generation firms became part of the
competitive market. The intuition for cost saving by one distributor sounds
plausible, the unit cost is likely to go down as the number of customers or
load increases on a system in a limited geographical location. But there
11
could be limits to economies of scale because grid stations, distribution
lines, and interconnectors become overburdened as load increases in a given
location. Similarly, diseconomies in equipment maintenance and overheads
along other x-inefficiencies can be imagined as distribution network area
expands unboundedly.
1.2.1 Distribution Networks
The distribution networks supply electricity from the transmission
system below 220 kilo volt, the network infrastructure includes distribution
lines and 132 kilo volt and lower capacity grid stations. As shown in Table 1
below, the electricity industry suffers with high system losses (including
theft) and high revenue losses. The non-theft system losses can be attributed
to the current state of technology and size of the distribution network. The
resistance loss increases as the size of a distribution network increases and
the system loss can also increase as demand increases. The regulator reports
that “distribution system in urban centres is over stressed and needs to be
upgraded, augmented, and expanded” (NEPRA 2010). Therefore technical
line losses can arise both in large networks (due to resistance) and small
congested networks due to resistance and high demand.
12
Picture 1: Overloaded Distribution Networks
Source: Pakistan Today, The News
On the other hand, system losses caused by theft and revenue losses
can arise from managerial inefficiency and corrupt governance. Even
technical losses resulting from poor engineering design and system
operation can be a result of bad governance and lack of planning. The
influence of managerial effort and pure technical losses cannot be
disentangled, as disaggregate data for the required analysis is not available,
however conjectures can be made where decentralized system loss data is
available for a distribution network. Similarly, the potential of theft can be
assessed from the number of customers and total households in a given
distribution network.
The average area of a government owned distribution system is 98
thousand square kilometres with average density of 67 customers per square
kilometre, as shown in Table 1.1. There is considerable variation in peak
13
load demand and composition of urban towns among networks. There is
significant negative correlation (-0.65) between network density and system
losses (including theft) or recovery (billing) losses15. Technical, structural
and managerial diseconomies exist in large distribution companies. For
instance, Hyderabad Supply Company HESCO is losing more than one-
third electricity from the system and at the top recovering less than 60 per
cent of final electricity sold16. The trends in Table 1.1 persist over time (see
Table 1.2, and Table 1.3).
The genuine system losses are not disentangled from theft losses,
but three companies QESCO, HESCO, PESCO are susceptible to huge theft
losses due to political instability and lawlessness in the region17. The high
losses also suggest that basic infrastructure is getting overstressed and
requires maintenance and replacements, while investment in substations,
distribution lines, and human capital will depend on the financial health of
the firm which in turn depends on system losses and billing losses.
15 Except privatized KESC distributing electricity in Karachi, high line losses in KESC are
probably caused by theft and lawlessness in a city of 12.9 million.
16 The regulation authority appears to be concerned about the inefficiencies in large
distribution networks; HESCO was divided into two distribution companies in 2011
(HESCO and SEPCO).
17 This is validated by published regulator reports and unstructured interviews with
officials.
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Table 1.1 Electricity Prices, Density, and Losses for Distribution
Companies, 2010
Distribution
Consumers
Peak
demand Density System
1 Billing PowerPurchase
Price
(rupee/kWh)
Company (MW) (consumer/area) Losses
(%)
Losses
(%)
IESCO 2,059,207 1457 88.9 9.8 4.1 7.6
LESCO 3,182,292 3916 166.9 13.7 8.2 8.2
GEPCO 2,454,254 1813 142.6 11.0 4.0 8.1
FESCO 2,879,188 2298 65.0 10.9 3.0 8.2
MEPCO 4,057,491 3006 38.5 18.9 4.2 8.7
PESCO 2,947,108 3685 29.0 37.0 14.6 11.4
HESCO 1,511,878 1797 11.2 34.8 40.2 11.0
QESCO 490,805 1316 1.4 20.7 42.3 9.0
KESC 2,051,964 2562 315.7 34.9
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010-11, 1 distribution network losses
Table 1.2 Distribution Network, Total System Losses1, (%)
Distribution 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Company
Peshawar 31.8 32.2 32.4 35.2 34.7 35.2 34.9
Islamabad 13.3 12.2 10.3 10.8 9.8 9.7 9.5
Lahore 10.2 11.7 11.2 10.7 11.0 12.0 11.2
Gujranwala 13.1 12.8 12.5 13.3 13.8 13.3 13.5
Faisalabad 11.6 11.5 11.1 10.6 10.8 11.2 10.8
Multan 20.5 18.7 18.5 18.4 18.9 18.2 19.3
Hyderabad 39.2 37.0 35.9 35.1 34.8 28.6 27.7
Sukkur 49.4 49.4
Quetta 20.7 21.4 20.8 20.1 20.7 20.4 20.8
Karachi 37.5 34.2 33.8 38.5 37.3 34.8 32.6
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011, 1 percentage gap between units purchased and sold/billed
by the firm
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Table 1.3 Distribution Network, Revenue Losses1 for Domestic
Consumers, (%)
Distribution 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Company
Peshawar 23.0 48.3 28.0 48.8
Islamabad 2.0 -3.0 0.4 4.0 -1.1
Lahore 1.0 3.8 3.1 0.8 -1.5
Gujranwala 2.0 3.1 4.1 2.0 3.4
Faisalabad 1.0 1.8 1.7 0.8 0.2
Multan 1.0 2.2 3.6 1.7 1.2
Hyderabad 26.0 42.1 51.1 54.1 36.7
Sukkur2 62.8
Quetta 10.0 28.2 31.0 26.5
Karachi 100.0 0.0 0.0 17.1 16.2
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011. 1 percentage gap between amount billed and amount
recovered, 2 Sukkur was part of Hyderabad before 2012. The negative numbers shows additional recovery on
account of deferred payments for previous years
Despite area-losses correlation, the other factors in poorly
performing distribution regions cannot be ignored, these include lack of
good governance, law and order, and economic development18. High system
losses of distribution companies manifest in the power purchase price for
distribution companies, in 2010 price ranged from 7.6 rupees per kilowatt
hour to 11.4 rupees per kilowatt hour19. The high revenue losses in
technically inefficient distribution companies suggests that incentives for
improvements in management are low, while new investment is not taking
18 Particularly poor law and order and weak political administrative structure in Quetta
QESCO, Hyderabad HESCO, and Peshawar PESCO regions
19 The variation in regional power purchase price is not in contradiction with uniform tariff
policy as average tariffs are affected by consumer mix and other tariff adjustment by the
regulator (as shown in Table 1.9).
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place due to poor financial performance that in turn will restrict the
capability of firms to improve system losses, and that becomes a vicious
circle.
Tables 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4 show the time trend for system losses,
revenue losses and potential consumers without electricity respectively. In
theory, housing units without formal electricity connection are not
connected to the system, but in practice they might be informally connected
to the system without any billing meter20, particularly in congested areas
and remote areas where monitoring of the system is poor or staff submit to
bribes. A major fraction of household consumers are not connected to the
system in distribution networks operating in Peshawar (PESCO), Hyderabad
(HESCO), Karachi (KESC), and Multan, coincidently the distribution
system losses are also high in these firms (Table 1.2). This supports the
hypothesis that households not connected to congested systems, such as
KESC, enjoy electricity stolen from the system. However, it is difficult to
attribute system losses to theft in low density networks, such as HESCO,
because the system is losing at low voltage lines while supplying electricity
to a dispersed population, for instance a high feeder is supplying electricity
on long low voltage lines to a few scattered houses with low demand.
20 An illegal connection to system without a meter is called “kunda” (the hook on the wire)
in local jargon
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Picture 2: Electricity Theft, Illegal Connections with Distribution Lines
Source: DAWN
On the other hand, all is not well with medium density low
distribution loss networks as high technical inefficiency and system losses
prevails in these networks as well. Again this can be a result of poor
engineering design, other technical losses, and managerial inefficiency. For
instance Gujranwala Electricity Company (GEPCO) is considered to be
among the better performing utilities according to regulator reports,
however in more than 40 % of GEPCO sub-divisions system losses are
higher than 12 %.
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Table 1.4 Domestic Consumers without Electricity, (%)
Distribution
Company
Potential
Consumers
2012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Peshawar 2,761,232 45.2 42.7 41.5 41.2 37.4 36.6 36.0
Islamabad 1,882,619 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lahore 2,258,940 14.1 11.5 8.6 7.3 4.9 2.6 0.6
Gujranwala 2,808,748 20.6 17.1 14.6 12.5 10.0 7.7 5.7
Faisalabad 2,712,234 30.4 25.7 21.2 18.1 15.8 13.4 11.3
Multan 3,888,629 45.4 40.2 35.8 33.8 31.2 29.5 27.3
Hyderabad 718,422 71.2 70.5 70.3 70.2 70.1 70.1 67.5
Sukkur 552,110 72.8
Quetta 394,843 71.9 71.2 70.6 70.0 69.7 69.6 69.4
Karachi 1,659,766 22.2 21.3 21.6 22.5 21.5 20.6 20.8
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 2011, estimate suffer substantial downward bias due to lower
estimated total potential consumer data in the distribution network, particularly in later years, the last Population
Census was conducted in 1998 and the available projections are much lower than actual figures based on partial
housing census of 2012.
Overall issues with system losses, engineering design, and
managerial practices will affect cost of electricity supply. The system losses
result in higher average unit cost of electricity with negative welfare
consequences for consumers. The shortage of bulk supply coupled with
system losses result in long periods of load shedding and low system
reliability. The system reliability in industry is measured by utilities
reporting System Average Interruption Index (SAIFI) and System Average
Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI). The long durations due to lack of
power supply in the system render SAIFI and SAIDI meaningless as it
becomes hard to disentangle the interruptions when there was no power
supply and the interruptions when power supply was there, but utility
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network collapsed due to poor technology. SAIFI and SAIDI are reported
in Table1.5 below.
Table 1.5 Distribution System Performance, 2008-09
Distribution Consumers SAIFI
1
SAIDI2Company
Islamabad 2,059,207 0.5 22.8
Lahore 3,182,292 100.2 6847.7
Gujranwala 2,454,254 17.3 19.4
Faisalabad 2,879,188 64.9 114731.9
Multan 4,057,491 0.03 2.01
Peshawar 2,947,108 193.97 15787.43
Hyderabad 1,511,878 918.53 83969.3
Quetta 490,805 155.4 12757.3
Karachi 2,051,964 0.1 1074.6
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2010, 1 SAIFI= (Frequency of Interruption/Total Connected
Customer) 2 SAIDI= (Hours of Interruption/Total Connected Customer)
1.2.2 Transmission Network
The transmission network plays a fundamental role in coordination
and achieving system economies, and enables the reliable, stable, and
efficient supply of electricity for final use in homes, markets and industries.
The importance of the transmission network in electricity industry depends
on its critical function and not just operational cost, as the smaller cost21
component of the transmission network in total cost of electricity can be
misleading (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). Generation and transmission
21 The cost components of generation, distribution, and transmission in Pakistan are 90%,
8%, and 2% respectively. However when system losses are included effective cost of
network components increase substantially.
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operations of electricity are simultaneous decisions, transmission lines link
power plants to load centres, and installing new generation capacity depends
on interconnectors and lines facilities provided by transmission companies.
The long run, low cost supply of electricity depends on investment and new
technology adoption in transmission, and with a high level of coordination
between generation and load centres. Lack of coordination and investment
in transmission systems can make generation investments ineffective or can
delay the supply of electricity due to dysfunctional interconnectors22, this
institutional context of electricity industry has favoured vertical integration
of generation-transmission and distribution. The existence of economies of
scale in the use of high voltage lines and transmission links make
transmission networks work efficiently as a natural monopoly. While the
natural monopoly structure of transmission exists in the electricity industry,
however for efficiency reasons high level coordination between
transmission and other components of industry is required for an efficient
and stable system.
Sunk costs in investments, formal and informal contracts, and
system externalities are main features of any transmission network. The
investment decisions by transmission operators require high level
coordination between load centres and generators, as post investment
22 For instance, recently a number of new power plants failed to supply electricity because
of inadequate capacity of interconnectors and transmission system (NEPRA 2011).
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reallocation of transmission infrastructure and resources becomes costly. It
is not clear that decentralization (unbundling) in industry structure will
increase or reduce the electricity supply cost in the system. This aspect is
important in Pakistan where policy making authority appears to pursue more
decentralization and structural disintegration in the system with independent
distribution and transmission networks. The successful unbundling of
electric power will require mechanisms for the enforcement of formal
contracts and regulatory set up to resolve contingencies uncovered in formal
contracts.
National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC) works as a
licensed monopoly, sole service provider covering a large area. Although
there is no optimal scale for system coordination, some past studies (Joskow
and Schmalensee, 1988) mention 10,000 MW of peak demand for efficient
scale of transmission network. The area coverage and peak load demand
suggests problems in NTDC system, constraints in extra high voltage
transmission lines resulted in increased forced outage of the power system
(NEPRA 2010). Although the overall transmission losses in recent years are
comparable with international standards (World Bank, 2012), see Table 1.6.
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Table 1.6 Energy Generation, Units Sold, and Losses in NTDC System,
2002-2010
Year Net Units Sold Transmission Distribution
Generation(GWh)
Billed
(GWh) Losses (%) Losses (%)
2002 59545 45204 7.6 16
2003 62694 47421 7.7 16.2
2004 67697 51492 7.3 16.1
2005 71670 55342 7.4 14.9
2006 80404 62405 7.1 14.8
2007 85987 67480 3.7 17.3
2008 84584 66539 3.4 17.5
2009 82705 65286 3.5 17.1
2010 87072 68878 3.1 17.4
Source: GOP, Electricity Demand Forecast, NTDC
The inexorable electricity demand in Pakistan, particularly the air-
conditioning during summer months, has pushed the peak demand to 16,000
MW in the system23 (NEPRA, 2011). In an electricity system, supply needs
to meet demand in real time, the system becomes unstable if demand is
higher than supply24. On the other hand, the system should be able to hold
supply to match rising demand. System operators need to check the
reliability of transmission systems to sustain peak demand, as policy makers
are keen to increase supply to meet unfulfilled demand in the future. It
appears that over the years, large gaps between demand and supply of
electricity during long summer season has weakened the coordination
23 The minister for power affairs recently mentioned in an interview that during hot summer
month demand keeps on exceeding supply as system add electricity from more production
or new plants. In summer, rolling blackouts have been observed since 2008 that imply
system operator might not even know exact peak demand during summer.
24 Constraints in transmission or distribution networks can make power system unstable; the
load shedding is required to keep the system stable since 2008 load shedding is prevalent in
country particularly in summer months.
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system between transmission and distribution networks. The load centres
(i.e. DISCOs) are unable to determine potential demand in the summer
season, as full demand is not met in all parts of the network at any given
time. There are even reported incidents stating that when some DISCOs
tried to meet peak demand, the distribution network was unable to sustain
the load.
1.3 Tariff Structure and Incentive Regulation
1.3.1 Cost of service and incentive regulation: theoretical aspects
According to the regulator, the electricity industry in Pakistan is
subject to price, entry and quality of service regulation (NEPRA, 2010), the
regulator, NEPRA, determines tariffs for transmission, distribution, and
generation business of electricity. This section examines the theory of
incentive regulation in the context of unbundled distribution and
transmission electricity networks. The basic idea is to review the issues that
arise when the regulator is imperfectly informed and faces asymmetric
information about costs and managerial efficiency, and to document the
optimal price mechanism in specific scenarios. The prevalent tariff structure
in Pakistan is reviewed later to check the conformity with theoretical
knowledge and also to see if the electricity industry satisfies basic
assumptions for exposure to incentive regulation for unbundled electricity
networks (Joskow, 2008).
24
The knowledge about effectiveness of electricity network regulation
in Pakistan is limited, Afia (2007) documented the overview of electricity
regulation in Pakistan, and highlighted issues including, the ineffectiveness
of the regulator, the lack of autonomy and weak governance of NEPRA,
although it is not quite clear what incentives there are for network operators
in the current setup to cut cost and enhance efficiency. There are multiple
factors affecting the current state of the electricity industry in Pakistan, but
regulation framework and related incentives appear to be an important
constraint in the growth of the electricity industry25.
The proper incentives for firms, operating regulated networks, are
important for the efficiency of networks and the generation segment,
because well performing networks will lead to better decisions and
operations by generation firms. The network service cost contributes to final
electricity supply cost, better incentives manifested in lower networks cost
can improve welfare for society. While documenting the regulatory
discussion Kahn, A.E. (1971) noted that “......the central institutional
question have to do with the nature and adequacy of the incentives and
pressures that influence private management in making the critical
economic decisions”. Ideally networks should be operated at minimum cost
and the regulator should specify the efficient network price. However, the
25 The comparison of electricity industry between a state monopoly (till 2002), and
regulated industry since 2002 requires deeper understanding of issues in both periods, and
is not feasible due to limited information available.
25
economic incentives in lowering production costs are more important than
enforcing the efficient pricing mechanism. This point is well documented in
the literature, as the efficiency loss of high cost is of “first order” (impact all
infra marginal units) while tariff or price inefficiency loss is second order
(Harberger triangle). These earlier notions and the latter theoretical
advances provide the foundation for incentive regulation in electricity and
other networks.
In a typical situation ex ante, a regulator is not perfectly informed
about managerial efforts, technical processes and other factors to lower
networks cost, but can get more information through ex post regulatory
hearings and mandatory audits. However, the distribution and transmission
companies are better informed about the cost of production and managerial
practices adopted to improve efficiency. In this situation two extreme tariff
regimes can be followed according to Laffont and Tirole (1993).
The first regime is a fixed price regime, where network fees will be
charged to consumers by distribution companies going forward. The fixed
network charge will evolve by incorporating exogenous price changes in
factor inputs; this is referred to as a price cap mechanism (Joskow, 2008).
As a price mechanism is responsive to only exogenous price changes, the
firm’s increased effort to lower cost will result in an equal amount added to
the profit of the firm. Therefore the effective price cap mechanism provides
greater incentives for the network operator to increase managerial efforts to
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reduce cost, improve system efficiency, and lower system losses. But given
that the regulator wants to make sure that the firm meets budget constraints,
uncertainty arises about the level of price cap. Too high a price cap can still
generate incentives to lower cost but may leave large profits for firms, so
the mechanism will not be good from “rent extraction” point of view.
The second regime is standard “cost of service regulation”, under
this mechanism the network operator will be compensated for all of the
production or service costs incurred to run a network. This tariff plan makes
sure that firms earn normal profit, so the “rent extraction” issue discussed
above can be fixed, but on the other hand there are no incentives for firms to
reduce costs as there is no economic rent left by the regulator. Therefore
managers will not get a reward for any cost savings in the “cost of service”
regulatory plan, or they will overspend in capital expense in line with
Averch-Johnson effects. The fixed price (price cap) regime performs poorly
on “rent extraction” while “cost of service” regimes will provide no space
for being cost efficient. In an ideal situation a mixture of two regimes can
perform better than the adoption of a single regime when the regulator is
imperfectly informed about network costs (Joskow, 2008), so in effect the
price will be contingent on variation in realised cost, while a portion of cost
will be fixed ex ante (Schmalensee 1989, Lyon 1996).
As noted by Joskow (2008) the theoretical literature provides partial
guidance for incentive regulation in electricity networks, and other
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circumstance based factors are also incorporated in the practical regulation
mechanism adopted by regulatory authorities. In practice, a mix of “price
cap” and “cost of service” mechanism is adopted by utilities. An initial price
level oP is set by using cost based or “return to capital employed” yardstick
and adjusted with the rate of input price increase (RPI) and productivity
factor z of firms in latter time periods, which gives equation,
1 0 (1 RPI )ZP P   (1).
The tariffs are initially imposed for usually five years and at the end
of the period oP and Z are readjusted after post regulation audit and
incorporating the firm’s realized costs. In practice, incentive regulation
requires an established cost of the service based regulation system. In
Pakistan the cost of service or rate base regulation started effectively in
2004, and from then on the regulator conducts “pricing reviews” to
determine tariffs for a period of time, this mechanism is evolving and recent
regulatory reports mention methodological process of tariff determination26.
In the next subsection the tariff or distribution margin determination process
for distribution networks is analysed, this will serve two purposes. First, the
regulator’s information sources for distribution companies costs are
highlighted, and the effectiveness of cost reporting protocols are assessed.
26 NEPRA tariff determination 2012-13
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Second, I check the potential of the regulator’s current cost information for
credible benchmarking of incentive regulation.
1.3.2 Cost of service and incentive regulation: practical issues
The analysis of incentive regulation for electricity networks usually
assumes that the electricity supply is unbundled with a clearly defined
distribution and transmission network, and the industry is regulated by an
independent regulator staffed with adequate strength and skills to monitor
the industry and implement regulation activities (Joskow, 2008), both of
these assumptions are subject to caveats in Pakistan. Although the electricity
delivery is unbundled, contractual relationships between network utilities
DISCOs and transmission monopoly NTDC are not well established, at least
on transparency grounds (NEPRA, 2010). The appointment of the board of
directors for DISCOs and interference of NTDC in DISCOs highlights the
lack of independence by utilities to run their managerial affairs. The
regulator faces constraints to implement the procedures and monitor
generation and transmission activities, and standard procedures to supply
basic industry data have not yet been adopted by distribution networks, from
regulator reports it appears that although uniform system of accounts for
DISCOs were proposed, such systems have not been operational till
recently.
The cost of electricity supply includes generation cost, transmission
cost, and distribution margins (DM), these tariff components are fixed by
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the regulator NEPRA. In 2011 the distribution margin including line losses
contributed to approximately 25 % of the average electricity cost, while
transmission network fees were less than 2 % of average electricity cost27.
The tariff structure is based on cost of service or rate of return regulation,
the electricity networks recover costs through distribution margin and
transmission cost. The cost is collected from consumers by Distribution
Companies DISCOs, and then DISCOs transfer power purchase price28
including transmission fees to the central transmission/dispatch company
NTDC29. In a single buyer model, NTDC procures electricity from all
generators at the prices agreed in Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) and
transmits bulk power to DISCOs on high voltage lines. The regulator
enforces the tariff mechanism under the principle that network operators
(transmission and distribution firms) recover sufficient return on capital to
cover all operation costs and reasonable funds for capacity expansion for
future needs (NEPRA 2010). The tariff is imposed for a period, and
intermediate requests for fuel adjustment charges are entertained by the
regulator. The frequency of pricing reviews and average cost for a selected
27 Estimates based on public data (NEPRA 2011)
28 Power Purchase Price PPP is a pass through cost item.
29 NTDC is given transmission license for a term of thirty years in 2002 by
the regulator. “The Company is entrusted to act as System Operator (SO),
Transmission Network Operator (TNO), Central Power Purchase Authority
(CPPA) and Contract Registrar and Power Exchange Administrator
(CRPEA)” (NEPRA 2011).
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distribution company are shown in appendix Table 1.1A and Figure1.2
respectively.
The regulatory tariff standards listed in the appendix (see Table
1.2A) and the discussion above imply that the current practice of price
regulation in the electricity industry is set in a “cost of service” or rate of
return framework. There is no “price cap” mechanism enforced and tariff
petitions are settled on a case-to-case basis. The distribution networks are
publicly owned monopolies facing no incentives to cut operation costs or
line losses as ultimately government through subsidy have to finance the
cost of the distribution companies to meet their budget constraints. Earlier,
some of the distribution companies proposed multi-year tariffs for five year
periods, but the regulator declared an incentive based price cap regime
unsuitable for the government owned distribution companies, until the
companies are partly divested or privatized (NEPRA 2004). All of the
distribution networks in the main system are government owned; therefore
the chances of incentive based regulation are minimal until distribution
firms are privatized.
1.3.3 Current incentive frame work and payment structure
The cost of service regulation prevalent in the electricity industry of
Pakistan along state ownership of generation, transmission and distribution
businesses have not allowed any cost minimization incentives in the
industry (see section 1.3.2). However, Government of Pakistan is facing
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stringent financial conditions by International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
reduce tariff differential subsidies for electricity industry and to mobilize
more resources and lower associated costs of the electricity supply. The
transmission and distribution business is owned by government30 and in
addition government also owns some of thermal generation business. In
settings of principal agent model, the ministry of water and power (MWP)
acts as principal on behalf of government while management of
transmission, distribution, and generation companies are agents to the
principal.
The top management of state owned entities in the electricity
industry directly face incentives as poor performance will result in the
removal or transfer of the management. At retail level distribution
companies (DISCOs) face incentives to lower distribution losses and
eliminate revenue losses (see section 1.2), however institutional capacity
and political constraints curtail these incentives. One of the institutional
constraints is high exogenous system losses resulting from given state of
technology, and in addition the financial health of the distribution
companies does not allow for the required investment in infrastructure that
will lower the system losses. The political constraints include
ineffectiveness of government and non-availability of law enforcement
30 Except privatized utility KESC in Karachi
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apparatus to lower the pilferage and recover unpaid bills particularly in
politically troubled parts of the country. There is evidence that incentives
faced by lower tiers of management in distribution companies are not
consistent with the incentives faced by their top management due to
corruption incentives at lower tiers (GOP 2013).
The distribution companies can stop supplying electricity to the
areas where revenue coverage is substantially lower and system losses are
unreasonably high. However the regulatory authority have shown reluctance
to allow distribution firms to stop supplying electricity to a high loss feeder
as the minority paying regular bills with a legal connection might suffer
from the indiscriminately operated power cuts in the affected areas. The
incentive based power cut policy was adopted initially by privatised utility
in Karachi and lately government distribution companies have started
implementing this policy in some parts of the country.
The incentives faced by the main transmission company, NTDC, are
similar to distribution networks, where lowering the losses will result in
lower effective wheeling cost. However institutional constraints not allow
for required investment to improve system performance. The ministry of
water and power (MWP) reports that required investment to revamp the
national grid is around $ 6 billion, while currently regulator allows $885
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million total annual investment to distribution and transmission segment of
the industry31.
The thermal generation capacity is partly owned by private sector
IPPs and partly owned by government owned companies GENCOs. The
power plants are allowed a certain heat rate by the regulator and plant
manager have incentive to economize on that heat rate by minimizing cost
of electricity generation. The IPPs potentially reap any heat based incentives
demonstrated by load factor and total output, while government plants have
lower available capacity as plants are quite old and not well maintained ( see
Chapter 2). Therefore government owned plants are restricted to increase
total sales with given dependable capacity which is much lower than
installed capacity.
The Ministry of Water and Power (MWP) notifies effective tariffs
for the sale of electricity to final consumers in the country, these effective
tariffs are lower than the tariffs determined by the regulator that results in
tariff differential subsidy. The MWP faces incentive to allow regulator
determined tariffs that will lower subsidy and free up more fiscal resources.
However, political constraints restrict the incentives to increase the tariffs as
low income household consumers are concentrated in some of inefficient
31 Total investment estimates based on various regulatory tariff determination reports
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distribution companies, while government want to pursue a uniform tariff
policy in the country (see section 1.2.1).
The system of payments in the electricity industry is shown in Figure
1.2. The distribution companies (DISCOs) conduct retail business and
collect revenues for the sale of electricity, after deducting electricity
distribution costs the DISCOs transfer payments to the transmission
company NTDC that also performs the role of Central Power Purchase
Agency (CPPA) based on the single buyer model. As the net revenues of
distribution firms fail to cover cost of total electricity purchased, the
ministry of water and power MWP transfers tariff differential subsidy to the
power purchase company to settle the accounts of government owned
generation companies and private IPPs. The delay in the subsidy payments
and poor recovery of sales revenue by distribution/retail firms create
circular debt in the supply chain and effects electricity supply in the system
(GOP 2013). The lack of transparency and delay in subsidy payments to the
distribution firms impact the financial performance of the distribution
companies. The financial dependence of the distribution companies on
Central Power Purchase Company (CPPA), which also runs transmission
business NTDC, potentially create incentives for distribution companies’
management to keep coordination high with CPPA and NTDC management,
that forces de facto vertical integration of the government owned electricity
supply business.
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Figure 1.2: System of Payments in Electricity Supply Chain
36
Figure 1.3: Real distribution cost, GEPCO (rupees per kWh)
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, 200-01 constant prices
1.3.4 Case study of a distribution network
The analysis based on a sample distribution company, Gujranwala
Electric Power Company (GEPCO) shows that the regulator determines a
firm’s distribution margin on the basis of reported costs for operation and
maintenance, depreciation, and Return On Rate Base (RORB) (e.g. cost of
capital). The frequency of pricing reviews for GEPCO is given in Table
1.1A. The distribution margin32 is the economic rent which the firm gets for
operating the distribution network. The margin consists of operation and
maintenance expenses, depreciation charges, and return on rate base, further
32 Although revenue requirements of a distribution network includes power purchase price
including transmission network user fee but that requirement is part of transfer fees so not
directly related to incentive items for a distribution company.
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adjustments are made for any income earned by the firm. The detail of the
distribution margin components is given in Table 1.7.
Operation and maintenance expenses, including wage and salaries,
are the largest component of a distribution network’s cost (about 90 %)
excluding transfer prices for generation and transmission companies.
Distribution networks are public owned companies and jobs are sanctioned
for various pay scales historically with employees entitled to post retirement
benefits. The regulator allows costs for salaries and wages based on past
audited figures with the adjustment of annual pay increases of public
employees and the impact of hiring on vacant positions, with very little
allowance for new staff hiring, particularly with non-technical contract
employees33. But pricing reviews reveal information asymmetry with the
regulator, for instance, in 2012 the regulator allowed Rs3,563 million for
wages and salary, while audited account puts the figure at Rs5,040 million.
Apparently, the company spends money through public exchequer and put
in prior year adjustments in the next year “pricing review”. This shows a
lack of consistent accounts data availability for current expenses of workers’
wages and post-retirement benefits. The regulator matches the GEPCO
request for new staff hiring with the justification for “prudent utility
practices”, while neither of the firms supply matching information on any
33 GEPCO is a 100 % Public Sector Company since unbundling the employees are hired on
contractual basis and regularised to permanent posts after sometime.
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potential “efficient utility practices” gained by new hiring, nor does the
regulator specify any yardstick for new appointments. This is quite similar
to the situation when new investment requirements by the firm are matched
with potential system improvement gains to justify new investment. The
lack of information coordination between the regulator and the distribution
company underlines the gap in current cost-based regulation regime. This
information gap needs to be filled in order to set the platform for incentive
based regulation and continual human capital investment in the distribution
firm.
Since regulation started in 2004, it is important that in this early
stage, standards in cost-based reporting are set and benchmarks are
established in order to perform cost-based regulation effectively. To some
extent goals were set at the same time as the “rate base” was set in 2004,
and updated accordingly in pricing reviews (Table 1.8). However, the basic
accounting information is coming from the distribution company through
internal audit reports. The regulator requests for the required information
from firms, but have not commissioned any study to determine the standards
for various cost components, listed in Table 1.7 and Table 1.8.
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Table 1.7 Distribution Margin GEPCO, Selected Years (million rupees)
2006-7 2007-8 2008-9 2011-12
2012-
13
Operation and
Maintenance 3,298 3,254 3,739
6,318 5,454
Depreciation 510 556 829 971 1,098
Other Income -970 -970 -1,116 -1,505 -1,960
Return on Assets 893 799 1,522 1,313 1,583
Income Tax 1951
Net Distribution Margin 3,732 3,833 4,979 7,097 6,175
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, data is missing for some years. 1: income tax paid
on profit earned.
Table 1.8 Rate Base GEPCO, Selected Years (million rupees)
2011-12* 2012-13**
Opening Fixed Assets in Operation 27,681 31,379
Assets Transferred During the Year 3,698 2,914
Gross Fixed Assets in Operation 31,379 34,239
Less: Accumulated Depreciation 9,387 10,485
Net Average Fixed Assets in Operation(Rate Base) 21,992 23,754
Plus: Capital Work In Progress (closing) 2,811 4,371
Total Fixed Assets 24,803 28,125
Less: Deferred Credit 11,516 13,324
Total Regulatory Base 13,287 14,801
Source: NEPRA, Tariff Determination Reports Various Issues, data is missing for some years,* actual, **
projected
According to regulation rules, sufficient tariffs should be allowed to
generate a reasonable investment in technology to maintain the system and
improve the reliability of the electricity supply (NEPRA 2012-13). In
practice the regulator cares for the effect of a firm’s capital investment on
rate base, so that chances of overinvestment can be reduced. However there
is no mechanism available to ascertain a reasonable amount of investment in
infrastructure that will ensure a reliable electricity supply. In regulatory
pricing reviews, GEPCO have not provided evidence of any perceived
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benefits of proposed investment to the regulator, but the regulator allowed
investment on the basis of past trends. This shows a gap of information in
the regulatory system which can result in overinvestment or under
investment in infrastructure for distribution companies. Since a reliable
electricity supply depends on continued investment in infrastructure, the
regulator should develop a detailed knowledge base for the investment
needs of distribution firms after taking into account future demand growth
and system reliability.
1.4 Public Sector Ownership, Subsidy, and Reforms Experience
The network part of the electricity supply including distribution
companies DISCOs and the transmission company NTDC are publicly
owned monopolies34, this is in line with industry practice in most countries
where the natural monopoly part of a power supply chain is treated as a
regulated monopoly35. The power sector reform started in the 1990s to
unbundle electricity and thereby establish distribution networks as
independent organizations with their own command and management
structure. However corporatization of DISCOs has not been worked out
fully and no formal contractual relationship exists among transmission,
distribution and generation (government owned) segments of the industry
34 There are also some generation plants owned by public generation companies GENCOs,
status of GENCOs and related issues are analysed in Chapter 2.
35 Although electricity networks can potentially save resources as regulated natural
monopolies, but they are not necessarily government owned in practice.
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(NEPRA 2010). A new government-owned establishment, Pakistan Electric
Power Company (PEPCO), was formed in 1998, to corporatize generation,
distribution and transmission units of the vertically integrated state
monopoly WAPDA, and make these entities administratively and
financially independent.
Published reports by the regulator suggest that PEPCO continues to
interfere in matters of government-owned generation and distribution firms,
posing problems for independent and optimal decision making and resource
allocation of these firms. The distribution networks claim that
noncompliance of efficiency and quality regulation targets results because
of centralized management of routine decision making through PEPCO
(NEPRA 2011). This gives an impression that the power industry has not
completed the transition from state monopoly to unbundled electric supply.
On the one hand, the efficiency gains from vertical integration and central
planning have decreased, while on the other hand, scant benefits have
emerged from unbundling. The actual situation regarding overall
management practices in industry might be even worse, as in the past all of
the firms were part of a vertically integrated monopoly with coherent
managerial hierarchy, while in the post-reforms period there is an increase
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in an interventionist role of other ministries and corporatization
departments36.
In the following discussion, two questions are raised. Firstly, what is
the role of public institutions in allocating resources among distribution
firms and how efficient are these transfer mechanisms? Secondly, what is
the motivation for changing ownership from public to private enterprise in
the electricity industry and is there any evidence within the industry to
support this?
The government of Pakistan has adopted a uniform electricity price
policy across the distribution networks in the country, although prices vary
across different customer categories within each distribution network. The
regulator determines the retail price of electricity for a distribution network
after taking into account revenue requirements of the firm including
distribution margin, while the government only allows a uniform end user
price according to the lowest determined price for each customer category
among all distribution firms (Government of Pakistan GOP, 2013). The
government does not allow the full passing on of the electricity supply cost
to customers, the gap between the cost of electricity and government set
tariff results in a subsidy referred to as tariff differential subsidy (TDS),
Table 1.9 highlights this gap for few periods. The failure of the government
36 A complete study of history of reforms requires detailed information and goes beyond the
scope here.
43
to settle tariff differential subsidy, regularly results in the accumulation of
Circular Debt37 in the electricity industry. The other major contribution in
this resource gap emerges from the inability of distribution firms to collect
revenue (either in the shape of no recovery of bills or high system losses,
see Table 1.1).
Table 1.9 Average Cost of Electricity Supply and Price charged in
Rupees
Period Cost Per1
KWh
Price Per2
KWh
Gap Per
KWh
24 February 2007 5.14 4.25 0.89
01 March 2008 5.6 4.78 0.82
05 September 2008 8.42 5.58 2.84
25 February 2009 8.42 5.63 2.79
01 October 2009 8.42 5.96 2.46
01 January 2010 10.09 6.67 3.39
Source: NEPRA, State of Industry Report 2011, 1 Cost based Tariff determined by regulator 2
Consumer-end Tariff determined by Pakistani Government
The tariff differential subsidy is transferred by the central
government to central power purchasing company NTDC, and the NTDC
allocates the subsidy among distribution firms. During 2007 to 2012 Rs1.29
trillion worth of price subsidies for distribution networks was transferred to
the central transmission company. There is no transparent information
available for the transfer of these payments (GOP 2013). Assuming transfers
are made according to the actual difference between regulator price (cost of
37 Circular Debt is common terminology in Electricity Industry of Pakistan, the debt is
caused by accumulation of deficit which results when payments flow in supply chain of
power is affected. The distribution companies do not pay the transmission company (power
purchasing agency) that does not pay power generators who do not pay to oil/gas supply
companies for fuel.
44
electricity supply) and the consumer end price (government allowed), the
resulting subsidy allocation mechanism lacks any incentive for an efficient
distribution firm. On the contrary, subsidy payment compensates for
inefficiency caused by a distribution firm.
For instance, Peshawar Electric Supply Corporation (PESCO)
experiences the highest operation cost including line losses, but it charges
the end consumer the price of the lowest cost supply firm according to the
government policy. As a result, PESCO recovers substantial business cost
through tariff differential subsidy, while an efficient supply firm collects
most resources through consumers. Since fulfilling budget balance
constraints and subsidy internalization, the mechanism is not transparent
and the exact welfare consequences for each firm are not clear. However, in
the current regulation and subsidy transfer system there are virtually no
incentives for unbundled electricity networks to increase efficiency and
reduce system losses.
Another issue with electricity industry reforms is the public good
nature of the electricity supply, although textbook classification will
categorize electricity supply as marketable private good but the practical
situation might require other considerations on equity grounds. The
electricity is generally supplied to domestic customers on low voltage wires
and due to resistance the system loss is high on low voltage lines compared
to long distance high voltage lines. The bad state of town planning in most
45
urban localities of Pakistan resulted in inefficient engineering design of
distribution networks (NEPRA 2011). The situation in rural localities and
small towns and villages is even worse where due to political pressure the
state monopolies provide electricity connections to remotely located
consumers, without evaluating the cost and benefit of the additional
connections to the system. The village electrification plan is one example of
politically motivated electricity provision as electricity system is owned by
the federal government and members of parliament make implicit or explicit
commitment to voters for the supply of the electricity. However it can be
argued on equity grounds that the people located remotely from the national
grid or distribution networks have same right to electricity supply as
compared to the people living in towns and located near the distribution
network. The poor engineering design of a distribution network increase
infrastructure cost and in addition also results in increased system losses, as
a result average cost of electricity supply increases for all consumers.
In that context, objectives of the basic model of the market based
policy reforms and the future of electricity industry is not very clear
according to available policy documents (GOP 2013a). The supply of
electricity to additional households based on poor engineering design will
result in more system losses and less revenues and if left to market either the
system will collapse or the firms have to cut off inefficient connections. In
current situation externality cost of system losses increase average cost of
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electricity supply for an average consumer. Instead of recovering the full
cost of electricity from consumers the government is subsidizing the price of
electricity by utilizing tax revenues. The reforms proposals by the
government are not clear towards the long run ownership of the industry and
perennial status of system losses (GOP 2013a).
The typical distribution network in Pakistan covers large
geographical areas and with growing demand of electricity continual
investment in generation and national grid is required for the secure future
supply of the electricity. There is evidence that market alone might fail to
generate sufficient investment for secure electricity supply, and the secure
future supply of the electricity can be thought as a public good (Abbot
2001). The investment gap in infrastructure and concomitant system and
revenue losses make future secure supply of electricity unreliable. Further
research is required to understand issues with privatization and market
based reforms the one utility so far privatised in Pakistan is still subject to
large amount of public subsidies (Khawaja et al 2012).
1.4.1 Privatization Reforms
The basic idea of the 1990s strategic reforms for state monopoly was
to make unbundled firms in the electricity industry administratively and
financially viable and then sell these firms to the private sector. However,
current financial chaos partially caused by the political pricing regulation
regime (uniform end user electricity price), lack of financial transparency in
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unbundled firms, and the Circular Debt, probably provides few incentives to
private buyers to invest in the electricity network business38. For instance,
for some time now, there have been publicly owned distribution firms with
high line and revenue losses potentially available for privatization,39, but so
far, have not been privatized despite government efforts.
In theory, if electricity is considered as a basic infrastructure facility
and the government wants to continue the supply of electricity to consumers
at an “affordable” price, then the government can transmit and distribute
electricity in-house or procure through a private supplier. The private
owner has an incentive to lower costs while facing a given output price, but
the private supplier might lower product quality. The private supplier might
lower quality of the product, as quality is non-contractible component of the
contract (Hart et al, 1997). In the case of the electricity supply specifying
quality of product is relatively easier than another public good such as
schooling or hospital as electricity is a homogenous product. The private
distribution firms can be monitored by a quality regulation regime with
specific parameters including average interruption indices. The efficiency
gains and asset ownership incentives also go in favour of the private
38 PEPCO formed in 1998 to monitor unbundling and corporatization for two years, the
slow pace of reforms can be judged from the fact that PEPCO dissolution occurred in 2012
39 Some of electricity firms including PESCO, QESCO, HESCO, and FESCO are listed on
privatization priority list, not clear about the timing of the inclusion or any future selling
date. Privatization Commission Pakistan
http://www.privatisation.gov.pk/power/power.htm (Accessed 13 September 2012)
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supplier, as private firms can offer a more flexible contract to employees
depending on their human capital and experience.
However, it is not clear what the economic gains of privatizing a
state monopoly (say a distribution network) will be, if the current regulation
with asymmetric information along government’s subsidy policy continues.
Keeping the regulatory regime unchanged will result in an inefficient
private monopoly instead of an inefficient public monopoly. The opinion on
privatizing state owned firms is divided among policy makers and
politicians (World Bank, 1997), overstaffing, non-performance based
worker salaries, and lack of transparent procurement are associated with
public owned electricity networks (GOP, 2013). However, in the absence of
a fully informed regulator and without an incentive based regulation regime
there is a chance that private firms will not function very differently than
public firms.
The pace of privatization and market based reforms in the electricity
industry is slow, so far one distribution firm, Karachi Electricity Supply
Corporation (KESC), has been sold to private firms. KESC was privatised in
2005; the comparison between KESC and other distribution companies can
give some idea for potential gains by privatizations on some selected
indicators. As the government implements a same tariff policy in the whole
country, so KESC also receives a public subsidy to cover the difference
between cost of electricity supply and average tariff charged to customers.
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However KESC’s policy is to cut power for longer hours in the locations
where revenue recovery is low and theft or system loss is higher. Although
KESC earned profit for the first time in 2012, the system losses are still high
(see Table 1.2). There is a modest reduction in KESC losses, again it is not
clear if that shows improvement in infrastructure or the effectiveness of a
better load shedding management plan. In comparison, no incentives are
available to government owned distribution companies (DISCOs) to lower
cost and improve quality of the electricity supply. The government recently
reconstituted boards of directors for DISCOs and increased the number of
private board members in these public companies, but still the utilities are
far from privatization.
1.5 Structural reforms in other developing countries
The electricity reforms experience in the developing countries is
quite varied and the reforms impact on the welfare of consumers and growth
of the industry is not clear. In many instances the reform process includes
entry of independent power producers (IPPs), unbundling of generation and
transmission, establishment of a regulatory agency, and development of a
wholesale electricity market. The cross country empirical evidence shows
that neither unbundling nor wholesale market can reduce prices; however an
independent regulator may result in a successful transition of the unbundling
reforms (Nagayama 2007). The reforms experience also shows that lack of
established regulation mechanism in developing countries can result in
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adverse consequences of structural reforms that impact consumer welfare
(Wolak 2008). Although unbundling and structural reforms generate new
investment opportunities in the industry but the reforms process puts stress
on regulatory oversight, and weak regulation can result in failure of the
structural reforms (Wolak 2008).
Some countries allowed commissioning of independent power
producers while not changing the structure of state owned vertically
integrated utilities, Thailand and Vietnam are sighted examples, where in
Vietnam despite entry of IPPs the vertical integrated electricity supply
company is owned by Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) (Nagayama 2007).
Similarly in India 7 out of 28 state electricity boards (SEBs) are unbundled
(Nagayama 2007). In Vietnam the weak regulatory process results in weak
enforcement of the strategy to curtail system losses and the regulatory
regime allows for tariff below average cost of electricity supply. In India the
electricity supply is subsidized to farming sector and too low prices and
high cost of electricity supply are restricting further investment in the
generation capacity (Wolak 2008), the experience of Nepal is not much
different than India where cost of electricity is not covered by consumer
paid tariffs and the electricity industry is unable to generate sufficient
investment (Nepal and Jamasb 2013).
Wolak (2008) emphasized that without lowering associated costs of
electricity supply further restructuring reforms will bring less benefits to the
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consumers in India. The performance of the industry in Pakistan is quite
similar to India or Nepal, where weak regulation allows electricity tariff
below average cost and there are no incentives for new investment
opportunities. However the source of weak regulation in Pakistan is not the
regulator itself, where regulator determines tariff to cover the cost of
electricity supply while federal government avoid passing on full cost to
consumers and allows tariff differential subsidy. The analysis of industry
documented by Wolak (2008) implies that there are higher short run benefits
of improving regulatory oversight than the benefits from implementing
further unbundling reforms. The unbundling reforms in Pakistan have posed
challenges for regulators as well where transition from vertical integration
to unbundled supply is not smooth (see section 1.2).
Finally, system losses in India, Nepal, and Pakistan are much higher
than Vietnam; the high losses highlight chronic investment deficit and bad
governance issues in former three countries. The regulator in Pakistan is
reluctant to allow infrastructure investments to network companies under
current ownership and performance status. Therefore the government of
Pakistan require strengthening the regulation system and removing tariff
distortions that will improve financial health of the transmission and
distribution firms and provide incentives for second round of the market
based reforms.
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1.6 Concluding Remarks
The cost of supplying electricity and the price charged to consumers
are two basic parameters that can be employed to evaluate the performance
of power sector reforms and the future of the industry. The production
incentives generated by current ownership structure and the regulatory
regime, along with other residual factors, are affecting price and cost of the
electricity supply. The price charged for electricity produced is not covering
the cost of production giving incentives for consumers to overuse electricity.
The inefficiencies in distribution networks including high line losses and
low recovery are imposing high costs for the electricity supply.
The technical losses in the system cannot be disentangled from non-
technical losses (including theft), continuous investment in physical capital
and system maintenance required to improve the reliability of the electricity
supply and reduce technical losses. The experience of privatization of one
utility does not support that non-technical losses can be reduced in short run
with a change of management or ownership structure. The multiproduct
nature of the electricity supply requires a reliable demand forecast, as the
cost of the electricity supply in high-demand summer hours will be different
from the low-demand winter season. The cost of the high-demand season
supplies has to incorporate future investment in infrastructure in order to
ensure reliability. In the current practice, the regulator and firms lack
53
sufficient knowledge about the required investment and potential costs of
the secure electricity supply.
In the current practice, investment rules of utilities that would affect
system loss reduction efforts and timely investment for reliable supply of
electricity are not being implemented. The distribution firms lack
information for the investment gap or at least they cannot justify the
required investment to the regulator, while the regulator has not set any
tangible yardstick for better utility practices. This information asymmetry
between the regulator and utilities is slowing down the growth of the
electricity industry and is not reflecting the actual cost of a reliable
electricity supply which might be substantially higher than determined by
the regulator. The revenue losses and system losses create a real challenge
to generate the investments required for revamping the basic network
infrastructure, let alone moving to new technologies such as real-time
monitoring and smart meters.
Further research should focus on the economic model of electricity
supply in Pakistan to address the fundamental question, is electricity a
public good, a private good or a marketable public good? The historical
experience in Pakistani context puts electricity closer to being a marketable
good supplied by the government. In the current situation, privatization will
make electricity a privately provided public good as has happened in the
case of Karachi Electricity Corporation (KESC), as KESC have supplied
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heavily subsidised electricity in private ownership since 2005. The
politically motivated village electrification plan follows in line with the
“cheap affordable electricity” model where the supply of electricity to a
scattered housing unit could result in substantial system loss. The future
industry reforms should be undertaken in light of further research and clarity
on the business model for the electricity supply in Pakistan.
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1.7 Data Appendix
Table 1.1A: Tariff Determination, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO)
27-03-2013 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by Gujranwala Electric Power Company Ltd. for Determination of its Consumer end TariffPertaining to the FY 2012 — 13
24-02-2012 Decision of the Authority in the Matter of Reconsideration Request filed by Ministry of Water & Power against Authority's Determination for GEPCO forthe FY 2011-12
13-12-2011 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for determination of its Consumer end Tariff Pertaining to the FY 2011-12
27-04-2011 Determination of the Authority in the matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for Determination of its Consumer end Tariff pertaining to the 2nd, 3rd and 4thQuarters (October - June 2011) of the FY 2010-11
09-12-2010 Decision of the Authority with respect to Motion for Leave for Review filed under Rule 16(6) of NEPRA (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998 byGEPCO against the Authority's Determination
08-09-2010 Determination of the Authority in the Matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for Determination of Consumer-End Tariff for 4th Quarter (April - June 2010)of FY 2009-10
19-04-2010 Determination of the Authority in matter of Petition filed by GEPCO for Determination of Consumer-end Tariff for 2nd Quarter (October-December)of Fy 2009-10
09-12- 2009 1st Quarterly Determination Based on the FY 2009-10 Determined under NEPRA (Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998 for GEPCO
14-09-2009 Determination of the Authority in the Matter of Petition by GEPCO for Determination of Consumer-end Tariff for the Year 2008-2009 under NEPRA(Tariff Standards and Procedure) Rules, 1998.
15-01-2009 Modified Decision of the Authority on Federal Government's Request for the Reconsideration of Gujranwala Electric Power Company Ltd (GEPCO)Decision dated 1st January, 2009 [Case No. NEPRA/TRF-102/GEPCO-2008 (3)]
09-09-2008 Determination of Tariff in respect of Petition filed by (GEPCO) [(Case No. NEPRA/TRF-102/GEPCO-2008 (3)]
30-05-2008 Decision of the Authority on Federal Government's Request for the Reconsideration of GEPCO decision dated January 10, 2008 (Case No.NEPRA/TRF-36/GEPCO-2005)
01-02-2008 Biannual Adjustment in the Consumer-end Tariff on Account of Charge in Power Purchase Price
10-01-2008 NEPRA/TRF-36/GEPCO-2005 (Revised)
28-06-2004 NEPRA/TRF-23/GEPCO-2003
Notes: In between more than 35 “fuel price reviews” were conducted by NEPRA to adjust fuel prices in electricity supply prices.
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Table 1.2A: Regulation Standards for Tariff
1. Tariffs should allow licensees the recovery of any and all costs
prudently incurred to meet the demonstrated needs of their customers,
provided that assessments of licensees' prudence may not be required
where tariffs are set on other than cost-of-service basis, such as formula-
based tariffs that are designed to be in place for more than one year
2. Tariffs should generally be calculated by including a depreciation charge
and a rate of return on the capital investment of each licensee
commensurate to the earned by other investments of comparable risk
3. Tariffs should allow licensees a rate of return which promotes continued
reasonable investment in equipment and facilities for improved and
efficient service
4. Tariffs should include a mechanism to allow licensees a benefit from,
and penalties for failure to achieve the efficiencies in the cost of
providing the service and the quality of service
5. Tariffs should reflect marginal cost principles to the extent feasible,
keeping in view the financial stability of the sector
6. The Authority shall have a preference for competition rather than
regulation and shall adopt policies and establish tariffs towards that end
7. The tariff regime should clearly identify interclass and inter-region
subsides and shall provide such subsides transparently if found essential,
with a view to minimizing if not eliminating them keeping in view the
need for an adequate transition period
8. Tariffs may be set below the level of cost of providing the service to
consumers consuming electric power below the consumption levels
determined for the purpose from time to time by the Authority, as long
as such tariffs are financially sustainable
9. Tariffs should, to the extent feasible, reflect the full cost of service to
consumer groups with similar service requirements
10. Tariff should take into account Government subsidies or the need for
adjustment to finance rural electrification in accordance with the policies
of the Government
11. The application of the tariffs should allow reasonable transition periods
for the adjustments of tariffs to meet the standards and other
requirements pursuant to the Act including the performance standards,
industry standards and the uniform codes of conduct
12. Tariffs should seek to provide stability and predict ability for customers;
and
13. Tariffs should be comprehensible, free of misinterpretation and shall
state explicitly each component there of
Source: NEPRA (2010)
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2 Comparative Efficiency of Public and Private Power
Plants in the Electricity Industry of Pakistan
2.1 Introduction
The electricity industry in Pakistan has been in transition for the last two
decades, the financial constraints in public sector and perceived potential
efficiency gains from private enterprise motivated the government to initiate
restructuring and privatization in the electricity industry. The Government
of Pakistan (GOP) have followed the policy of commissioning new
generation capacity in the private sector with the non-utility owned
independent power producers IPPs since 1994 (GOP, 1994). The new plants
supplied electricity to two state owned utilities40. The initial reforms in the
power generation segment are followed without much evidence on the
productive efficiency of electricity generation plants or any comparative
advantage across electricity generating establishments, either between
private and non-private or utility and non-utility owned plants. The
regulator's reports41 present technical indicators of the performance of the
public plants, but no information about comparative economic efficiency for
40 During early transition there were two vertically integrated public utilities in Pakistan,
Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and Karachi Electric Supply
Corporation (KESC). KESC was privatized in 2005, while WAPDA is in erratic transition.
41 National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the regulatory authority,
publishes annual State of Industry Reports to review electricity industry progress.
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public and private plants is documented in these reports, particularly after
taking into account their distinct characteristics.
One exception is the study conducted by Saleem (2007), which
shows that the public ownership of a plant have a negative impact on
technical efficiency. In that study, the technical efficiency comparison
between public and private plants is made in the stochastic frontier
framework without any explicit discussion on the factor of cost of inputs42.
The technical efficiency analysis is helpful to understand whether the plants
achieve maximum possible output with given inputs, however the analysis
does not tell us whether a plant is economically efficient. However, in order
to check which system is supplying electricity at the lowest cost, it is
important to analyse the performance of power plants from an economic
efficiency or operational cost aspect. This chapter measures cost function
for electricity generation plants after controlling for entrepreneurial and
other relevant characteristics. The estimated unit cost function can give an
indication for efficiency differential across government owned and private
owned plants.
The electricity industry in Pakistan is performing poorly, as the
current system is characterized with high unreliability, pervasive load-
shedding, lack of investment in new capacity (to keep up with demand
42 Different mix of inputs on same isoquant can result in different economic efficiency due
to variation in factor prices.
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growth), and system losses (both physical and due to theft). The World
Bank's enterprise survey 2010 shows that, 65 % of Pakistani firms perceive
that electricity is the main business growth obstacle. Rolling blackouts are
common not only in small towns but in major cities as well. There can be
multiple reasons for the current disorder in the electricity industry, but a first
stage could potentially be the evaluation of economic efficiency in the
industry. Overall economic inefficiency in the electricity industry can be
caused by either issues with electricity prices43 or operational efficiency in
the generation, transmission, and distribution sector. However the main
question in this chapter focuses only on evaluating efficiency in the
generation component of industry. This is not to deny that the efficiency
issues, for instance in the transmission system or distribution network, do
not have implications directly or indirectly on the performance of generating
units, but the idea is to evaluate in a simple cost function framework
whether in the short run, existing generation capacity is being efficiently
utilized or being operated at the least cost supply. The efficient performance
of generating units can be considered as one of the necessary conditions for
the overall economic efficiency of the system.
43 Electricity price might not be equal to marginal cost.
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In one perspective, this chapter evaluates the comparative
performance of private enterprise in the electricity industry of Pakistan44.
Since the generation sector is the major sector having substantial private
firms; it is obvious to focus on the generation sector in this chapter. The
entrance of the private independent power producers (IPPS) into the
electricity industry of Pakistan is in line with international experience in
order to increase the competiveness of the electricity generation segment,
where the generation segment is thought to be a relatively competitive
segment of the electricity industry (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983).
However, it can be argued that, if the reforms to encourage private
enterprise in electricity generation are actually framed in order to enhance
competition in the industry, or the new capacity is commissioned to cater for
high demand that was not being fulfilled with existing public plants supply.
According to recent policy briefs, GOP recommend transferring the
ownership of public generation companies (GENCOs) to private
management to increase the productive efficiency, this indicates that at a
policy level there is some recognition that private enterprise is better for
business. To draw any policy implications, it is desirable to estimate the
productive efficiency according to plant ownership, this can give some idea
44 However this comparison is not intended for “treatment-evaluation” as plant ownership is
not exogenous.
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for the extent of existing cost efficiency differential among public and
private plants.
As discussed in Chapter 1, the reforms and regulation process could
have a differential impact on the electricity generation operations of two
large vertically integrated utilities, because Water and Power Development
Authority (WAPDA) is still in transition and Karachi Electric Supply
Company (KESC) is already privatized. In this chapter, empirical
experiments include an efficiency comparison between the utility-owned
government plants and utility-owned private plants. The regulation of
industry has followed with the corporatization of the public utility-owned
plants into generation companies (GENCOs) with changes in managerial
practices, while the private utility owned plants45 are either being
substantially restructured or new plants are being commissioned during the
sample period.
In order to create technological homogeneity across plants, the
analysis in this chapter is based on fossil-fuel power plants (i.e. oil and gas
based). Further, there are two institutional reasons for focusing on fossil
fuel. First, the private investment is mainly limited to fossil-fuel plants, and
the major share of new generating capacity (during last two decades)
consists of fossil-fuel plants owned by private firms. About one third of the
45 These plants are owned by Karachi Electricity Supply Company.
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total electricity was produced by private generators in 2002, and the private
sector share of production reached about two thirds in 2010. Second, fossil
fuel plants are the major electricity producer now, and about two thirds of
total electricity in the country is produced by fossil fuel, 57% of which is
produced by oil and 42 % is generated by gas. Utility owned plants produce
40% of the electricity, while private sector IPPs generate 60 % of the total
electricity produced. Almost all of the non-utility owned generating units
installed since the 1990s run on fossil fuels, and the new investment in the
generation segment which is mainly undertaken by private firms, is also for
the plants running on fossil fuels.
The current evidence of comparative generation performance is
more in terms of technical efficiency (Saleem, 2007), with the indication
that private plants are more technically efficient. For the fossil-fuel plants,
the technology of generation can be described as the process of generating
heat from the fuel input (e.g. oil, gas, or coal) and converting that heat into
electricity. The standard measure of fuel efficiency in electricity industry is
presented as kilowatt-hour per heat unit (i.e. British thermal unit BTU), the
available data supports the notion that fuel efficiency is higher for private
plants than public plants. These findings are not surprising given the age of
the independent private plants, as most of these plants started operation after
the 1994 power policy. The important contribution of this study is to
measure the economic efficiency of electricity production, as technical
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efficiency or fuel efficiency only covers the technical aspect of efficiency
and does take into account the input cost. It is also important to measure the
economic efficiency after controlling for other observable relevant variables
which might impact on the performance of the plants.
In the short run the production efficiency can be evaluated from the
cost of supplying electricity, which will depend on the efficient maintenance
of plant equipment, minimum fuel costs, and the efficient utilization of
labour (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983). In theory, electricity generators
connected to the national grid are minimizing costs given inputs and
electricity prices, irrespective of the given market structure. Deviations from
cost minimization behaviour can occur due to coordination and agency costs
involved in plant management. These costs can be amplified when
electricity prices are set by an asymmetrically informed regulator (Laffont
and Tirole, 1993). Literature shows that management practices can also be
an important factor associated with productivity differential across firms
(Bloom and Reenen, 2010). There is a potential variation in management
practices across plants, because non-utility plants are run by private
entrepreneurs, probably in line with modern management practices, while
the major portion of the utility owned plants are under bureaucratic
management and have government employees, so public plants are still
minimizing cost but with certain additional constraints which private
producers do not face or can avoid.
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The findings in this chapter show that, for the given sample, in the
major part of the national grid the non-utility private owned plants46
performed better than the utility-owned public plants. The average unit cost
difference is large and significant between utility-owned public plants and
private plants after controlling for the other factors. The findings raise
doubts about the policy of using public plants as base-load plants, at least on
the basis of average fuel cost comparison. It appears that high tariff charged
by private firms might be blocking the way to use them as base-load plants.
The following analysis in the chapter is divided into seven sections.
The next section discusses the institutional details of the electricity
generation segment in Pakistan and the possible implications for cost of
generation are followed by information about the sample in section 2.3. The
empirical model is specified in the section 2.4, findings are presented in
section 2.5. Section 2.6 contains a brief conclusion, and data appendices are
included in section 2.7.
2.2 Electricity Industry of Pakistan
Historically, the electricity industry in Pakistan consisted of two
vertically integrated utilities that were government monopolies. Karachi, the
largest metropolitan area in Pakistan, is served by the Karachi Electricity
Corporation (KESC) and the rest of the country was covered by the Water
46 The term “non-utility private plant” and “independent power producers (IPPs)” are used
interchangeably.
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and Power Development Authority (WAPDA)47. The electricity industry is
an important sector of Pakistan’s economy, providing 15 % of final energy
consumption. The power generation segment is also a major consumer of
primary energy, 30 % of the total gas consumption and 42 % of the total oil
consumption in the country is attributed to fuel consumption in the power
generation segment. The electricity industry also receives a substantial
subsidy (more than one third of electricity revenue) through the public
exchequer. The industry has been in transition for the last two decades, with
privatization, deregulation, and corporatization strategies running parallel.
The 1994 Power Policy allowed private firms to establish power
plants and sell electricity to KESC, and WAPDA (GOP, 1994). This was in
line with the industry experience that the generation segment does not need
to be efficiently served by a few suppliers as compared to the transmission
or distribution segment (Joskow, 1997). The Government of Pakistan 1994
Power Policy says that “Presently the total installed capacity in the country
is 10,800 MW. This capacity is insufficient to meet the demand on a year
round basis....The system is characterized by a high degree of suppressed
demand. Conservative projections for annual average increase in the
demand are nearly 8% per year for the next 25 years,……such an ambitious
47 The current industry status changed with the privatization of KESC in 2005 and
privatization and restructuring of WAPDA started in 1998, the fossil-fuel based power
generation companies GENCOs of WAPDA work under Pakistan Electric Company
PEPCO, in practice WAPDA is still a vertically integrated utility and restructuring and
disintegration has not been worked out (Afia ,2007; NEPRA 2010)
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programme cannot be financed in the public sector due to ceilings on Public
Sector Development Programme (PSDP), and resource mobilization in the
private sector is essential for meeting these development targets”.
As new private sector investment was limited to electricity
generation, it is desirable to understand the processes behind productive
efficiency according to plant ownership, and to document any differential
impact of the institutional changes on the unit cost of energy production
between private and public plants. In the short run the production efficiency
can be evaluated from the cost of supplying electricity, which will depend
on the efficient maintenance of plant equipment, minimum fuel costs, and
efficient utilization of labour (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1983), therefore it
is essential to note the impact of reforms on each component of operational
cost.
The fossil-fuel power plants currently connected to the system have
homogenous technology; however there is a substantial variation in the
vintage of these plants. The private plants are mostly new plants, while
public plants are fairly old plants. The basic technology converts heat input
(British Thermal Units) derived through oil or gas into electricity produced
(kilowatt-hours). This means that technical efficiency will be higher in
newer plants (i.e. private) than older plants (i.e. public), assuming that new
technology can produce more output with a given heat input, after
controlling for the calorific value of fuel. Recent reports by the regulator
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show that the average technical efficiency for private plants is about two
times that of public plants, this indicates that government plants have a
declining generation capacity and poor technical efficiency (NEPRA 2010).
However, it is not clear whether the technical efficiency differentials are
manifested in the cost performance of the power plants and overall
economic efficiency of the system. In the absence of any existing research,
published regulator reports and available data can be employed in order to
understand the comparative economic performance of the power plants.
The early industry reforms were intended to disintegrate the main
public utility (i.e. WAPDA) and convert public plants into independent
generation companies (GENCOs), which will compete with the private
producers to supply electricity to the national grid. At face value, the
GENCOs are working as an independent establishment, however the failure
of corporatization of WAPDA affected the financial independence and
performance of public plants. Even the routine services of public plants are
not timely performed, For instance, the failure of a timely procurement of
spare-parts because of the lack of liquidity of the GENCO resulted in poor
maintenance and operations of these plants (NEPRA 2010). The regulator's
reports show that the existing public power plants need to be utilized round
the clock to meet the persistent high demand over the year, this means the
plants are probably used as base-load plants. The lack of mandatory
shutdowns resulted in the poorly planned maintenance of government plants
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(i.e. major overhauling, hot gas path inspection, combustion inspection, and
annual boiler inspection), therefore the plants run on partial load and forced
outages of the plants also increases.
The average availability, peak load sharing to installed capacity,
varies from 42 % to 58 % for public plants, which is much lower than for
private plants. The load factor, an important industry indicator, defined as
the ratio of total output to potential output at the maximum load assigned to
a plant, also indicates the weak state of government plants. The average load
factor for public plants is 50 % while for private plants it is 78 %. The lower
load factor for the public plants ( for a given amount of electricity produced)
implies that the plant runs for a longer period in order to produce the given
output, and possibly has more plant deterioration and higher fuel
consumption to produce any given amount of electricity.
The privately owned electricity plants work under the 1994 Power
Policy, this means that under the payment mechanism of the power purchase
agreements (PPAs), monthly capacity payments consisting of debt service,
fixed operations and maintenance costs, insurance and return on equity on
an internal rate of return basis, were all assured even if no electricity was
purchased. In addition private plants receive payments for energy purchased
on a per unit energy charge basis. The upfront tariff mechanism can give an
incentive not to operate the least cost supply plant, as the tariff system was
not based on a competitive framework of installing a new generation
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capacity (GOP, 1998)48. The IPPs probably forecasted that plant factor for
the initial years of production will be lower, given the growth and demand
for electricity in the late 1990s, and therefore cash flows will depend on
capacity price. How this affected their decision making during the
investment process is not clear.
Labour efficiency can be a factor in the efficiency differential
between government owned and private owned plants. The private
generation companies are well managed, have better human resources
(Khwaja et al 2012). Anecdotal evidence goes in favour of the transfer of
experienced and skilled staff from public to private plants or elsewhere in
the private sector, this is due to better incentives for engineering and non-
engineering staff. The failure of corporatization of WAPDA raise doubt on
any efficiency gains of better human resource management in government
plants (NEPRA 2010). Similarly KESC privatization in 2005 might not have
affected the labour management substantially, at least for the first few
years49. In the public sector, over-staffing and related costs run high during
the politically elected governments. Between 1999 and 2007 there was no
major political change (i.e. a mix of authoritarian and democratic setup), but
48 It is less clear if Averch-Johnson effect is present as the average size of non-utility plants
is smaller than utility owned plants. The political motivation arise from lack of
transparency in firm selection process, and missing competitive bidding failed to sort out
generation unit on least cost basis (Fraser, 2005).
49 KESC’s new management tried to reduce over staffing in utility recently, but failed to do
that due to political pressure. Although the proposed staff reduction may not be for the
generation component of the utility
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GENCO’s were part of WAPDA and were exposed to political over-staffing
before 1999 under successive democratic governments.
2.3 Data and Related Issues
The main sources of data are published reports by the National
Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA). The estimation of plant
level short-run variable cost efficiency requires sub firm level or unit level
data, while collecting data the maximum possible disaggregation is utilized
given data availability constraint. In the electricity industry a plant can
house several independent units of various vintage. The definition of ‘the
plant’ in this study depends on a mix of managerial, accounting and
regulatory context. For instance, non-utility private plants are dispatched as
a single unit, while public plants are dispatched unit wise or in blocks of
units depending on fuel input used. However, unit level data makes arguable
sense for short-run working cost performance, but in this analysis a plant
can be an aggregate of several units or a single unit, depending on the
availability of data.
As the analysis is focused on oil and gas based fossil-fuel power
plants, the plants producing hydroelectricity have not been included in the
sample. Further, two nuclear plants and one coal plant are also not included
due to possible differences of fuel cost and technology compared to oil and
gas based plants. The full sample includes 83 electricity generating
plants/units that were operational between 2006 and 2011, and the sample
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size is 356 plant-years. Interestingly there is a match between
disaggregation in available data and disaggregation required at plant level
due to the unit variation of vintage within a plant. For instance, the variation
in unit age within a plant is higher for public plants, and the disaggregated
data is available at a unit level for public plants, so that any inefficiency
differential in vintage can be captured there. On the other hand, the non-
utility owned private plant data is available at aggregate plant level
(aggregated for all units within a plant). Since most of the private firms
started operation during a short span of time with the possibility of
homogenous units within a plant, the chances of a cost efficiency
differential due to data disaggregation at a unit level for public plants, and
data aggregation for private plants, are reduced if not eliminated.
The necessary data needed to estimate the variable cost function
includes fuel prices, fuel consumption, total wage bill (i.e. labour cost), and
variable maintenance expenditure. In addition, data on total cost of
production, total electricity generated and maximum plant load assigned is
required at plant level. The main sources of data are published reports by the
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the National
Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC) and Karachi Electricity
Supply Corporation (KESC)50. NEPRA State of Industry report includes
50 The complete list of variables collected is give in appendix Table 2.1A
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plant level data on generating capacity, electricity generated in a year, fuel
quantity, and load factor. The detailed information on required variables is
available for the majority of government plants, however operation and
maintenance expenditure and labour cost variables are missing for private
plants (i.e. IPPs). Since the focus here is on fossil-fuel based plants (i.e. oil
and gas run plants), the fuel expenditure is likely to be the most important
component of total variable cost. This intuition is supported by the evidence
that fuel cost is about 94 % of total variable cost for the given sample for the
public plants, and the corresponding estimated figure for private plants is
about 93 %51.
2.4 Empirical Production Model
In the case of single output production process, productive efficiency
can be assessed by observing whether the firm is maximizing output given
the inputs and if the best mix of inputs is employed given input prices. The
production function describes the possibilities of transforming inputs into an
output without taking into account the relative prices of inputs. On the other
hand, cost minimization assumes that firms minimize production costs for a
given level of output by incorporating the input prices. An electricity plant
might be producing maximum electricity using a given mix of plant,
51 The estimate for private plants is based on fuel cost component and operation and
maintenance cost component of upfront power tariff
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material, fuel, and labour, but it may not be minimizing cost if labour was
cheaper than material, while the plant used more of material and less of
labour. Even if there are different types of fuel used to produce heat input, it
will be cost effective to use cheaper fuel for a given amount of heat
produced. So if it is possible to produce the same level of goods by using
more labour and less material or different fuel, then the plant can lower cost
by employing a different mix of inputs. Therefore the efficient electricity
generating plant will minimize the cost of producing any amount of
electricity, given input prices.
The productive efficiency comparison between utility owned and
non-utility (private) owned electricity generation plants in this chapter is
based on cost function specifications. Duality between the production
function and cost function allows an econometrician to recover production
parameters from the cost function under certain regularity conditions
(Diewert 1971), and similarly the cost minimizing factor demand
expressions can be derived from production function. Nerlove (1963) and
Christensen and Greene (1976) are two works celebrated for the earliest
application of duality theory in the empirical analysis of the electricity
industry. Their motivation hinged on the exogeneity of factor prices and the
exogeneity of electricity output, this is because factor prices are typically
determined in competitive markets or through regulation, while electricity
output is mainly determined by the load demand. Therefore fuel prices and
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electricity output are not related with unobserved heterogeneity in the cost
function. Estimating production function complicates matters as inputs
become endogenous for the plant manager and then a full structural
specification will be required in order to consistently estimate the
technology parameters (Markiewicz, Rose and Wolfram 2004), with limited
data available for Pakistan, the structural estimation of the production
function will not be feasible.
Recent empirical studies in industrial organization literature have
employed cost function estimation to address various performance related
issues in the industry (Maloney 2001), and estimating cost function can be a
good starting point to build base knowledge about the performance of the
power generation industry in Pakistan. The price and output exogeneity
appear to be credible assumptions in the case of Pakistan, as plants are
forced to produce the required electricity, and profit maximization by the
power generation firms does not seem plausible. The oil and gas regulator
controls the fuel prices, while the power generator purchases fuel according
to plant technology. The ownership of a plant can change the level of cost
function, or as mentioned in NEPRA reports, utility owned plants may
generate a particular amount of electricity at higher cost as compared to
non-utility owned plants, but to improve on average unit cost comparison,
an econometric cost function can control for all observed relevant factors
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.These different empirical experiments along summary statistics are
discussed in section 2.5.
2.4.1 Base specification of cost function
I have specified the simplified form of trans-log cost function in the
style of Foreman-Peck and Waterson (1985) as goal function, which is the
extension of previous work (Christensen and Greene, 1976). Further, trans-
log framework can be used to study substitution effects, scale effects, and
technological changes (Greene 1980). The specification proposed here is
quite informative as it incorporates the effect of load factor on the average
unit cost of electricity generation. Load factor ( load ) is defined as total
electricity output (q) in a period, divided by the product of maximum load (
m ) and the time plant remain connected to load (v) (i.e. qload
m v


). Load
factor is an important factor affecting the cost of electricity generation
(Foreman-Peck and Waterson 1985). The adapted version of trans-log cost
function is given below in the equation (1).
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Where ( C ) is unit cost of production as Rupee per kilowatt-
hour, pstands for fuel price per million British thermal unit (MMBTU),
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a g e variable capture vintage of the plants, and priva te is an ownership
dummy, takes value 1 if the plant is owned by a private firm and 0 if the
plant is owned by a public generation company. The electricity output is
scaled in kilowatt-hours, while capacity utilization is based on maximum
load in kilowatts and the proportion of time the plant remained connected to
load. Recent studies have employed different expressions of capacity
utilization, for instance, Maloney (2001) used an added term to model 1
(given above) called intermittent idling (electricity generation time as a
proportion of total time in year), this term may be more useful when coal
based generation is high, which is not the case in Pakistan. The above
specification is estimated for fuel unit cost only, because in fossil fuel based
power generation, funds allocation on fuel input is likely to be substantial.
This intuition is supported by the available data, where on average 93 % of
total variable expenditure can be attributed to fuel cost in both public and
private power plants. There is also a limitation of data for price indices for
labour cost and maintenance cost of the private power plants.
2.5 Findings and Results
The summary statistics for the variables used in regression analysis
are presented in Table 2.1 are for the sample of public and private plants for
the plant years with positive production and non-zero fuel inputs. The
private plants were further subdivided into utility owned and non-utility
owned groups, where utility owned plants are owned by the Karachi Electric
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Supply Corporation (KESC). The summary statistics presented in Table 2.1
are for an aggregate sample and can miss the variation across plants over
time. The average fuel price (rupee per MMBTU) is lower for public plants
and utility owned private plants compared to non-utility owned private
plants, this is mainly due to the composition of the fuel mix used for power
generation (Figure 2.1). On the other hand, public plants produced
electricity on higher average unit cost (rupee per kilowatt-hour) than private
plants. There are substantial differences in average plant age according the
plant ownership. On average, private non-utility plants (IPPs) are about 17
years younger than utility owned plants. The average capacity utilization, as
measured by load factor, was higher for private non-utility plants compared
to public plants
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Table 2.1 Summary statistics for power plants
Variable Observations Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
Government Plant
Output (GWh) 184 506.9 456.8 0.5 1887.1
Unit Output Cost (Rupee per
KWh) 184 3.8 2.1 0.8 10.6
Fuel Price (Rupee per
MMBTU) 184 295.7 182.7 41.1 798.0
Load Factor (%) 184 49.1 26.6 0.2 97.0
Plant Age 184 27.9 10.2 10.0 51.0
Private Plant (IPPs)_
Output (GWh) 73 2121.0 2402.1 50.4 9140.8
Unit Outpu Cost (rupee per
KWh) 73 3.6 1.8 0.6 7.1
Fuel Price (Rupee per
MMBTU) 73 429.2 209.2 73.4 839.8
Load Factor (%) 73 77.2 18.3 5.1 98.6
Plant Age 73 10.4 3.0 1 19.0
Private Plant (utility owned)
Output (GWh) 99 451.1 477.3 0.1 1553.5
Unit Output Cost (rupee per
KWh) 99 2.9 1.1 1.3 8.7
Fuel Price (Rupee per
MMBTU) 86 223.5 101.6 126.5 705.1
Load Factor (%) 98 82.4 8.8 49.4 96.8
Plant Age
(years) 99 22.6 11.3 1.0 42.0
Notes: Estimates based on plant year data for 2006 to 2011, 1MMBTU≈293 kWh  
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Figure 2.1 Fuel Source of Electricity Production 2006-2012, (%)
Cost function specification (1) described in the previous section is
employed to produce regression estimates for public and private plants,
results are given in Table 2.2. Results for three experiments are presented in
Table 2.2; the column titled (1) includes the comparison between all public
and private power plants in the country. The next two columns in Table 2.2
include the comparison between public plants and IPP plants, and the
comparison between public plants and utility owned private plants
respectively. The performance difference between public and private plants
should be manifested in either the difference in slope coefficients, or an
intercept shift, or both, for the estimated cost function. Structural stability
tests cannot accept the hypothesis of equal coefficients between public and
private plants for year dummies and vintage coefficients for three
experiments mentioned above, further, the coefficient on log prices is also
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statistically different between non-utility private plants (IPPs) and public
plants in column (2) of Table 2.2.
Regression results in column (1), column (2) and column (3) of
Table 2.2 are produced after allowing for separate vintage effects for private
plants and for the adjustment of separate slope coefficients for fuel prices in
column (2). The log fuel price coefficient is statistically significant in all of
the models and the estimated price elasticity of average unit cost for the full
sample is 0.90. This shows less than one to one percentage change in
average unit cost with respect to the change in fuel price. In column (5) of
Table 2.2, the estimated fuel price elasticity for utility owned private plant
IPPs is higher than public plants. The price elasticity of unit output cost is
also higher for utility owned private plants in column (6). This shows that
the partial effect of fuel price change on average unit cost is higher for the
private plants compared to the public plants. That also shows that on
average private plants use relatively expensive fuel compared to public
plants.
The estimated plant vintage coefficient for public plants is
statistically different than private plants, the estimated coefficient for the
two groups is-0.001 and 0.014 respectively. The impact of private plant
aging on unit cost is positive which that implies the newest IPP plant will
produce at 26.6% lower average unit costs compared to the oldest IPP plant,
holding other factors constant. The vintage coefficient for public plants is
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not statistically significant, showing no substantial impact of plant aging on
unit cost of public during the sample. However, the public plants are quite
older than most of the private plants and due to deterioration over the years,
the group of public plants consists of technically inefficient and
homogenous plants.
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Table 2.2 Comparisons of pooled regression estimates of cost function, dependent variable log output unit cost
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log fuel prices 0.902*** 0.873*** 0.884*** 0.880*** 1.025*** 0.977***
(0.02) (0.022) (0.02) (0.021) (0.027) (0.058)
Log electricity output -0.321 -0.471* -0.375 -0.304 -0.441 0.793
(0.191) (0.204) (0.246) (0.259) (0.822) (0.533)
Square of log electricity output 0.005 0.01 0.007 0.005 0.01 -0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.019) (0.014)
Log load factor 0.043 0.05 0.04 0.054 0.002 0.236
(0.024) (0.029) (0.023) (0.034) (0.085) (0.199)
Age of plant -0.001 0.0004 0.0001 -0.002 0.009 0.009***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Age of plant*Private plant interaction 0.015*** 0.013* 0.009***
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Dummy for private plant -0.330*** -1.239*** -0.153**
(0.053) (0.163) (0.055)
Log Fuel Prices * private plant interaction 0.147***
-0.032
Constant 0.208 1.657 0.691 0.264 0.003 -12.329*
(1.841) (1.949) (2.298) (2.362) (8.455) (5.6)
Observations 343 257 270 184 73 86
R Square 0.945 0.960 0.943 0.947 0.987 0.926
Notes: The estimates are based on pooled sample for 2006 to 2011, standard are clustered at plant level, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at plant level,
specifications are titled with column numbers, where (1) covers overall sample, (2) private IPPs and public plants, (3) public and utility owned private plants (KESC plants), (4) Public Plants only, (5) IPPs
only, and (6) Utility Owned (KESC) private plants. R-square for all models is between 0.93 to 0.99, further Ramsey RESET reject the null hypothesis that models have no omitted variables in most of the
specifications.
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In a cost function scale, economies can be evaluated on the basis of
output coefficients. Output and output square coefficients have expected
signs but are not statistically significant in most of the regressions in Table
2.2 (except Column 2). Therefore, there is no clear evidence of scale effect
on cost reduction for public and private plants. However, the subsample of
plants running on gas fuel demonstrates substantial scale economies as
shown in appendix Table 2.2A. There might be potential confounding
between scale economies and vintage, the IPPs plants running on gas are
younger in age and larger in size, while public plants operating on gas are
fairly old and small in the size. The estimated scale economies (
1 log( ) / log( )SCE c q   ) are presented in Table 2.3 below.
Table 2.3 Economies of scale for gas based units
SCE Standard Error
All Plants 1.14*** 0.02
WAPDA System 1.10*** 0.02
Public plants and KESC plants 1.00*** 0.04
Statistical significance *** p<0.001
The estimate on the plant ownership dummy in column (1) of Table
2.2 tells that private plants in the system produced electricity at 33 % less
unit fuel cost as compared to public plants, after allowing for different slope
coefficients for the year dummies, and plant vintage, and after controlling
for other observable factors. Similarly, results in column (2) of Table 2.2
show that public plants produce electricity at a substantially higher average
unit cost compared to private IPP plants. The bulk of non-utility owned
84
private IPPs are in the WAPDA system where private plants produce
electricity on substantially lower unit fuel cost than public plants. The
comparison between private plants owned by the Karachi Electric Supply
Company (KESC)52 and public plants in the WAPDA system is shown in
column (3) of Table 2.2; the estimates show that the average unit cost for
private utility owned plants is 15 % less compared to the average unit cost
for public plants. The results for public, IPPs and utility owned private
plants (i.e. KESC plants) are given in last three columns of Table 2.2
respectively. However standard errors of individual regression results in
column (5) and column (6) might be problematic due to a small number of
clusters for IPP plants and utility owned private plants.
The regulator reports present declining fuel efficiency for public
plants in the WAPDA system on the basis of technical efficiency alone (the
ability to convert given amount of heat into kilowatt-hours), this left room
for the perception that public plants were operational at a low cost due to
generating electricity with gas as fuel input (a relatively cheaper fuel). But
evidence on the economic efficiency here reinforces the notion that public
plants are not only less technically efficient but are also economically
52 The private plants in KESC system, the only type, are mainly utility owned plants. The
two main systems are WAPDA (or NTDC) system and KESC system KESC grid is inter-
connected with the NTDC grid system through two double circuit 220 KV transmission
lines, KESC purchased on average 330 gigawat-hours annually from WAPDA system
during 2005 to 2010.
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inefficient, particularly relative to IPPs in the system. Further, the estimated
results in appendix Table 2.2A show that gas fuel based public plants also
produce electricity at a higher average unit cost compared to gas fuel plants
owned by private companies. Therefore fuel allocation policy, in particular
gas supply policy needs reconsideration and scarce gas fuel should be
supplied to cost efficient plants wherever possible.
The results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.2A require qualification and
may have some implications as well, the analysis is based on the short run
cost function where fuel cost is employed to proxy total variable cost, and
therefore any implications should be considered in this context. The private
plants, IPPs, are younger in age compared to public plants and WAPDA’s
generation companies (GENCOs) have not invested in new public plants or
in any major repair plan for the existing units (that are fairly old) since
industry reforms started early 1990s53. So the reason for the low efficiency
of public plants is likely to be caused by the lack of operational maintenance
and missing routine repairs, this point is highlighted in recent regulator's
reports as well (NEPRA, 2010).
The absence of data on wage bill and routine maintenance for private
plants constrained the estimation of a full specification of short run variable
cost function. The future research requires the collection of detailed cost
53 Kot Addo Power Plant was the only young public plant completed in 1996, but was
privatised in 1996. GENCOs plants are being revamped recently with funds supplied by
United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
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information for private plants in order to incorporate price indices for wage
bills and plant maintenance. The findings in this chapter do not state that
privatization will improve the efficiency of a given plant. In order to
propose a policy like the recent option of transforming public plants into
private management will require a further understanding of the issues
behind low efficiency in the public plants.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The estimation of the cost function for power plants is an attempt to
compare plant performance according to ownership. The results presented in
this chapter show that public plants are less efficient than private plants both
technically and economically. This does not say that private plants are
performing better on other dimensions of cost, including wage bills and
maintenance, because this exercise is based on limited information
particularly for private plants. The cost to the overall system not only
depends on unit cost of production but also depends on the price charged by
private plants to the retail supply companies. To assess the cost of private
production to the final supply of electricity, further research is required to
analyse the long term contracts between IPPs and the central power
purchase company. The public plants are owned by public companies (i.e.
GENCOs) but the management of these plants is still part of vertical
integrated utility. Dynamic issues in the regulation of other components of
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utility and issues in the transmission and distribution side have potentially
affected the functioning of public power firms and thereby plants.
The current state of public sector plants also needs to be looked in
the historic context of industry reforms and vanishing new investments
either for repairs on existing plants or for setting up modern vintage sets.
Effectively the public plants are still part of vertically integrated utility, so
the lack of financial independence and related tariff issues are required to be
well understood for the future reforms.
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2.5 Data Appendix
Table 2.1A: List of variables
Installed Capacity (MW)
Dependable Capacity (MW)
Units Generated (GWh)
Auxiliary Consumption (GWh) from own system
Auxiliary Consumption (GWh) from other system
Units Sent Out (GWh)
Gross Heat Rate
Net Heat Rate
Gross Efficiency %
Net Efficiency %
Shutdown Hours
Total Running Hours
Maximum Load (MW)
Plant Load Factor (%)
Plant Utilization Factor (%)
Plant Capacity Factor (%)
Plant Availability Factor (%)
Gas Consumed (MCF)
HSD Consumed (Liter)
RFO Consumed (MTon)
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Figure 2.1A: Unit fuel price (Rupees per MMBTU)
Figure 2.2A: Unit fuel cost (Rupee per Kilowatt hour)
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Table 2.2A: Comparisons of pooled regression estimates of cost
function, dependent variable log output unit cost (plants running on
Gas)
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3)
Log fuel prices 0.897*** 0.893*** 0.876***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.033)
Log electricity output -0.501* -0.777*** -0.883***
(0.189) (0.185) (0.231)
Square of log electricity output 0.009 0.017*** 0.021**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log load factor 0.043 0.042 0.034
(0.024) (0.023) (0.018)
Age of plant -0.008** -0.005 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Age of plant*Private plant interaction 0.021*** 0.014* 0.011*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Dummy for private plant -0.581*** -1.087*** -0.195
(0.084) (0.216) (0.119)
Log Fuel Prices * private plant interaction 0.083*
(0.039)
Constant 2.418 4.710* 5.515*
(1.856) (1.827) (2.114)
Observations 181 139 150
R Square 0.930 0.957 0.930
Notes: The estimates are based on pooled sample for 2006 to 2011, standard are clustered, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,
*** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at plant level, specifications are titled with column numbers,
where (1) covers overall sample, (2) private IPPs and public plants, (3) public and utility owned private plants
(KESC plants). Further Ramsey RESET rejects the null hypothesis that models have no omitted variables in most
of the specifications.
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Table 2.3A: List of plants used in empirical analysis
Public Plants
GTPS Faisalabad (Unit 1 to Unit 8)
GTPS Kotri (Unit 1 to Unit 6)
NGPS Multan (Unit 1, Unit 3, Unit 4, and Unit5)
SPS Faisalabad (Unit 1 and Unit 2)
TPS Guddu (Unit 1 to Unit 4 and Unit 9 to Unit 12)
TPS Jamshoro (Unit 1 to Unit 4)
TPS Muzaffargarh (Unit 1 to Unit 6)
Private IPPs
AES Lal Pir Limited
AES Pak Gen (PVt.) Limited
Altern Energy Limited
Engrow Energy Limited
Fauji Kabirwala Power Company Limited
Gul Ahmed
Habibullah Costal Power Company Limited
Hub Power Company (HUBCO)
Japan Power Generation Limited
Kot Addo Power Company (KAPCO)
Kohinor Energy Limited
Rousch Pakistan (power) Limited
Saba Power Company
Southern Electric Power Company
Tapal Energy
Liberty Power Limited
Uch Power Limited
Private KESC (utility owned)
Bin Qasim Thermal Power Station (Unit 1 to Unit 6)
Korangi GTPS (Unit 1 to Unit 4)
Korangi CCGT (Unit 1 to Unit 4)
Korangi GTPS-II
Korangi Thermal Power Station (Unit 1, Unit 3, and Unit 4)
Site GTP (Unit 1 to Unit 5)
Site GTPS-II
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3 Competitive Structure and Bank Loan Rate?
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I estimate the relationship between the loan price and
number of banks in the corporate loan market of Pakistan. I have
constructed an original dataset that includes loan price (interest rate) and
market structure (number of banks) in more than 300 markets across
Pakistan. The constructed loan data set is based on loan level universe from
Pakistan which includes all loans issued to the corporate borrower between
2006 and 2012. I utilize variation in market structure (number of banks)
along variation in borrower and lender characteristics in order to highlight
the important factors that affect interest rate in the loan market. The
literature in the developing countries context focuses primarily on policy
interest rate pass-through and the impact of monetary policy on the interest
rate (Edwards and Khan, 1986), but there is limited information available
about how market structure and related characteristics affect loan price in
geographically isolated markets. The analysis in this chapter bridges that
gap by employing market level loan data to study the price concentration
relationship in the banking industry of Pakistan. To the best of my
knowledge this is the first effort to measure a price-concentration
relationship in the Pakistani banking industry at market level; the findings
can be useful for policy analysis and further research.
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The structure conduct (SC) hypothesis says that an oligopolistic
structure of markets results in higher concentration and higher prices for
loans or lower prices for deposits (Berger and Hanan, 1989). Therefore
borrowers will face higher loan prices in the markets where there are few
banks or a small number of large banks, compared with the markets where
there are a large number of banks with less market power. On the other
hand, efficient structure (ES) logic says that the few banks with a large
share reflects the efficiency of these banks as they capture the market due to
lower cost and thereby lower loan prices (Demesetz, 1973). In Pakistan both
forces can be in operation, as post liberalization experience shows an
improved efficiency of the banking industry (Burki and Niazi 2010),
however the outreach of new private banks is limited to large cities with
negligible banking operations in fringe markets (Patti and Hardi, 2005),
rendering the local isolated markets relatively more concentrated compared
to large cities.
Many developing countries started financial liberalization and
privatization reforms in 1990s, the motivation was that liberalization
reforms in the banking industry increases efficiency of financial
intermediation and spur economic growth (World Bank 1997). The pre-
liberalization experience shows that credit was directed towards public
sector and inefficient private sector on interest rates below market rates, and
the credit rationing crowded out efficient private borrowers (World Bank
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2005). The financial liberalization reforms included interest rate
liberalization policies, privatization of state owned banks and policies that
enhanced role of market in financial intermediation (World Bank 2005). The
post liberalization experience of banking performance is varied across
countries. The performance of banking industry in India shows that with
public ownership and high budget deficit the liberalization benefits remain
limited as banks mainly extend credit for government financing (Gupta et al
2011). The Latin American experience shows that market concentration is
not related to competitive conduct, however post liberalization foreign entry
reduced bank margin and profitability (Yildirim and Philippatos 2007). In
many countries banking industry is far from competitive performance and
benefits of liberalization are quite limited (Aboagye et al 2008).
The positive correlation between market concentration and bank
performance is well documented in OECD countries (Weiss, 1989), but the
lack of disaggregated loan/deposit data for developing countries restricted
micro level analysis for the impact of market structure on price setting and
profitability in the banking industry of many developing countries. The
financial reforms started in Pakistan in the 1990s, the post liberalization
changes require an inquiry into the banking industry as the new entrants and
presence of foreign banks changed the structure of market, which potentially
affected the operations of large incumbent market players. The financial
market reforms included interest rate liberalization reforms, which allowed
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banks to offer multiple products at different price levels across different
markets in the country. The presence of entry and price liberalization
reforms in the banking industry of Pakistan is of potential research interest,
but the research in industrial organization of banking is restricted due to the
lack of availability of disaggregated data. The availability of market level
business loans Credit Information Bureau (CIB) data have made it possible
to measure price-concentration relationship.
The interest rate in the loan market can vary due to change in other
market factors including interest rate channel, bank lending channel
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995) and bank capital channel (Stein 2002). However,
in this chapter the focus is to understand the impact of industry structure on
the price setting behaviour of banks and to check the robustness of the
correlation between market concentrations and the interest rate charged by
banks in a given market. In previous studies on the banking industry in
Pakistan, Khwaja and Mian (2008) found that there is no significant impact
of bank lending channel on loan rates in Pakistan, while Fazal and Salam
(2013) estimated an incomplete pass through for interest rate channel.
The banking industry in Pakistan has been exposed to liberalization
and regulatory reforms since 1990; this was followed by entry of a number
of banks. The potential change in market structure in banking industry
makes it interesting to explore the connection between competitive structure
and market prices. The studies conducted on post reforms banking industry
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shows substantial improvement in bank performance and reduction in
market concentration at the country level (Mahmood 2009; Patti and Hardy
2005), which probably changed the strategic behaviour of large incumbents
as they were facing less competition before reforms and entry54. In the early
period of reforms, the operations of large banks were on a wider
geographical scale than new entrants, but later on central banks encouraged
small banks to enlarge their market and open new branches in locations
other than large cities as well. The availability of loan data for each
corporate borrower and each market, and information about the branch
network at a local level can be used to estimate the relationship between
competitive structure and market prices in the banking industry.
This chapter is organised in this fashion, the next section reviews
selected literature on concentration and price, section 3.3 presents
background and structural change in the Pakistani banking industry, section
3.4 explains data and highlights related issues, and section 3.5 explains
econometric specification. The summary statistics and results are discussed
in section 3.6. Section 3.7 concludes with final remarks and plans for further
research. Additional tables and Figures are available in data appendix in
section 3.8
54 The reforms also have direct impact on performance because privatization changed
ownership and potentially management practices in incumbent banks.
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3.2 Literature Review
Within industrial organisation literature, the interest in market
concentration and price is quite old, a number of oligopoly theories predict
that price will increase with an increase in concentration level in the market.
The classic oligopoly theories of Cournot and Bertrand imply a positive
correlation between price and number of firms under specific assumptions
for cost and demand conditions (Weiss, 1989)55. According to another set of
early theories, firms in the market start acting collusively when their market
shares reach a certain level (Chamberlin, 1962), the idea is that firms will
set price above minimum average cost once they realize they have reached
that concentration level. Weiss (1989) and Newmark (2004) document
theoretical intuition behind a number of price concentration studies, Weiss
(1989) includes empirical studies on price concentration conducted in
various industries.
The price-concentration studies were preceded by profit-concentration
studies, where profit-concentration studies were based on structure conduct
hypothesis, the main prediction of these studies was that market share and
profits are positively correlated (Buzzell, 2004). The profit-concentration
studies have been criticized due to a measurement error in profitability and
the cross industry nature of the data sets employed in these studies, as cost
55 For example, in Cournot model with zero costs, the price will be proportional to 1 / N
where N is number of firms.
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and demand conditions vary substantially across industries (Singh and Zhu,
2008). The studies based on reduced form profit equations are subject to
Demsetz’s (1973) criticism where superior firms capture market share and
charge a low price to compete out other firms. The studies documented in
Weiss (1989) try to address critique with profit-concentration studies, as
these studies are industry specific and prices are less susceptible to
measurement errors as compared to firm profits. Finally, these studies are
less open to “superiority critique” similar to Demsetz (1973).
As documented in Weiss (1989) and Singh and Zhu (2008) the price-
concentration studies cover a variety of industries including airlines
(Borenstein and Rose 1994), banking (Berger and Hanan 1989) and (Calem
and Carlino 1991), cable television (Emmons and Prager 1997), driving
lessons (Asplund and Sandin1999), grocery (Cotterill 1986), and hospitals
(Keeler et al. 1999). In this chapter, price equations similar to Berger and
Hanan, 1989 are used to test for structure conduct hypothesis.
In this chapter the number of banks in a given market is considered
exogenous and that is a maintained assumption as discussed in the next
sections. However, the concentration or number of firms in the price
equations is also considered endogenous in previous literate (Schmalensee
1989). In the banking industry the number of banks in a town will depend
on demand and cost conditions in that town, while the loan prices will also
be determined by the same conditions in that town. For example, a large city
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with high demand will attract a large number of banks as compared to a
more remote, less commercial town with low demand. As argued in the next
section, in this chapter the number of banks in a market is treated as
exogenous because entry conditions are restricted by licencing arrangements
made by the central bank.
Although market structure is assumed exogenous in this chapter, the
endogenous market structure has received attention in some current
literature, One approach is to use a panel data method with instrumental
variable technique in order to fix the OLS bias (Evans et. al, 1993). Singh
and Zhu (2008) have used a two-step estimation technique where in the first
stage the equilibrium model of entry is estimated to predict the number of
competing firms in a market, and in the second stage, the correction term
(derived in first stage) is used to correct for correlation between price and
competitive structure. Both of these approaches require appropriate data in
order to estimate the price-concentration equation, studies such as Evans et.
al (1993) require panel data set while the estimation of entry model similar
to Singh and Zhu (2008) requires detailed information on demand and cost
conditions in the relevant markets. There are limitations to construct a panel
data or estimate an entry model by employing banking data provided by the
Credit Information Bureau (CIB), the data set used in this chapter for
analysis. The main result in the estimation in this chapter is based on
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exogenous market structure assumption, further details are documented in
relevant sections.
3.3 Structural Changes in Banking Industry of Pakistan
The banking industry in Pakistan was dominated by five large
government owned banks until financial reforms started in late 1980s.
Before the reforms, more than 80 % of the total banking assets were
controlled by the five government banks56, the remaining market was served
by 25 foreign banks operating in urban areas and niche markets, and branch
operations of these banks were restricted by regulation (Patti and Hardy
2005). The Government of Pakistan initiated broad range financial sector
reforms in the late 1980s, the reforms started with privatization of state
owned banks and was followed by permission to open 10 private domestic
banks and 3 foreign banks in 1991 (State Bank of Pakistan, 2003), see
Figure 3.1.
A number of new private banks opened in the following years, the
number of domestic private banks increased from 0 to 15 and total banks
went up from 25 to 46 between 1986 and 1997 (See Table 3.1 and Figure
3.1). In the same time period, foreign bank branches increased from 51 to
75, while local bank branches went up from 6,955 to 8,446. During the
56 Five Banks are, Habib Bank Ltd HBL (1450 branches), National Bank Ltd (1245
branches), United Bank Ltd UBL (1082 branches), Muslim Commercial Bank MCB (1025
branches), and Allied Bank Limited ABL (760 branches), number of branches in 2008.
UBL, MCB and ABL were privatized during 1991 to 1993.
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1990’s the banking industry witnessed substantial growth and changes in
governance and corporate structure of the Banks. The initial banking
reforms were followed by an institutional strengthening of the central bank,
where the central bank received more autonomy and also increased the
quality and spread of banking regulation.
Table 3.1 Number of Banks in Pakistan 1990-2007
1990 1995 2000 2003 2007
Government Owned 6 6 6 5 4
Domestic Private 0 15 14 18 26
Foreign Private 21 20 20 14 6
Specialized Banks (domestic) 4 4 4 3 4
Total 31 45 44 40 40
Source: Mahmood (2009)
Figure 3.1 Number of banks and bank branches (1987-2011)
Note: Source State Bank of Pakistan, includes all bank branches
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Post reforms, market share of the private domestic banks and the
foreign banks increased, but the foreign bank focused on selected clients
and multinational companies (Mian, 2004). The private bank entry was
mainly domestic banks occurred in a time window from 1991 to 1995, and
from 1995 onward the issuance of licences to open new banks was
implicitly suspended57, that trend continued during the current analysis
period from 2006 to 2012. However, restrictions on the opening of private
bank branches (local and foreign) reduced, while government banks were
restricted to open new branches in addition government banks were
encouraged to closing unprofitable branches (State Bank of Pakistan, 2003).
The introduction of risk based capital requirements in 1997, and later an
increase in paid-up capital requirements was followed by a central bank
facilitated merger and the acquisition of the banking sector in Pakistan
(Mahmood, 2009). All of these developments rendered a number of banks
quite stable during 2006 and 2012, this supported the assumption that the
number of banks is exogenous.
The Pakistani banking market is dominated by big five banks with
more than 50% share of total banking advances in 2008, these banks are
considered dominant banks with large market share and an extensive branch
network throughout the country. The dominant banks owned 5,562 bank
57 Motivation of moratorium could be bad performance of new banks (Mahmood, 2009),
proliferation of banks and restricting foreign bank entry (Patti and Hardy 2005). State Bank
of Pakistan issues licence to any bank want to do banking business in the country.
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branches out of total 8,274 domestic bank branches in 2008 (foot note 54).
Although the big 5 banks are still widely operating across country their
country level market share gone down since 1999 (Mahmood, 2009). The
new entrants have potentially increased competition as the market share of
the big five banks is declining. The non-price competition including quality
of services offering new product facilities have motivated the big five banks
to catch up with entrants. The Credit Information Bureau (CIB) data reveals
that incumbents (big five) and entrants are selling similar products in the
corporate loan market.
The empirical analysis in this chapter assumes that the number of
banks in the corporate loan market was stable from 2006 to 2012. The
consolidation process started in 1997 and negligible new entrants support
stagnation in the market structure. The number of total bank branches has
gone up since 2006, as shown in Figure 3.1, but that includes all branches
while the price-concentration analysis in this chapter is based on bank
branches that offer corporate loans to firms. The political situation of the
country and capital requirement by the central bank might also have forced
an implicit ban on new corporate lending banks in Pakistan between 2006
and 2012.
3.4 The Credit Information Bureau (CIB) Data
One of the contributions of this chapter is to employ a unique loan
universe in order to construct market level data that includes loan prices (i.e.
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interest rate), and the number of banks for more than 500 markets across
Pakistan. The loan level universe is provided by the Credit Information
Bureau (CIB) at the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP)58. In addition, Bank
Branches Data published by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is employed
for some analysis. Loan level CIB data and bank branches data are collected
by the SBP to implement “prudential regulation” and are used to regulate
and monitor financial performance of the Banking Industry in Pakistan. The
CIB data used here lists the end of month report for each outstanding
corporate loan issued between April 2006 and May 2012, and the universe
of loans includes all outstanding corporate loans throughout the country59. A
corporate loan is a loan given to business organizations; these include listed
companies, non-listed companies, and partnerships. Importantly, the CIB
universe employed here does not cover single person liability businesses60
(i.e. the unregistered enterprises owned by individual entrepreneurs).
The CIB data is of an established quality and has been used in the
recent banking literature (Mian and Khwaja, 2009, 2010). The CIB data in
this chapter covers a quite recent time period and includes new fields
including borrower and lender identifier, loan size, interest rate, borrower’s
58 State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) is central bank and financial regulator in Pakistan.
59 Only fund based loans, where actual amount was disbursed, are included in the sample
and non-fund loans including letter of credit or letter of guarantee are dropped from the
analysis.
60 Unregistered businesses owned by individuals are quite pervasive in informal developing
economies such as Pakistan; in the CIB data business loans issued to single person owned
unregistered firms are categorized as consumer loans.
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type, and loan maturity date. The description of selected variables covered
in CIB is presented in appendix Table 3.1A. Khwaja and Mian (2009, 2010)
augmented the CIB data with additional borrower and lender characteristics,
for instance one of their studies includes information on the political
connection of the borrower. Higher confidentiality conditions with the CIB
universe employed in this chapter restricts the scope of merging external
borrower and lender details similar to Khwaja and Mian (2009, 2010) with
the CIB data.
The CIB data reports a loan in the database until the loan is settled,
and there is no loan identifier in the data, therefore outstanding loans
reported over time cannot be identified with a numeric identifier. However
as each borrower is uniquely identified and each bank is also uniquely
identified, one can trace a loan issued by a specific bank to a specific
borrower on a given date for a given product. Therefore the loan is defined
by the borrower-bank-product pair for each reported month. The
outstanding loan data is reported in the CIB database for each loan until a
loan is settled. However, for the analysis only first time reported data is used
because the main purpose is to measure the relationship between the loan
price offered by a bank and the number of banks in a given market, and the
price of loan and other characteristics can be noted in the first reported
transaction. That leaves 36,279 borrowers, 107 lending institutions and
260,332 reported loans in the selected data.
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Defining the loan market is critical for estimating the price-
concentration relationship, and operationalizing this is not free of
problems. The loan market in this chapter is identified according to the
location of borrowers (i.e. business location), I have assumed that firms
borrow locally or borrow from the nearest town, in case the location is a
very small village without any bank. There is no published evidence to
confirm that firms actually borrow locally. However, unstructured
qualitative interviews with bank managers and CIB officials support the
notion that firms borrow locally, particularly for working capital loans and
other routine services. Banks issue loans to local firms in order to lower
their transaction cost. In most of the transactions, individual guarantees,
credit relationships, and physical assets (e.g. land, plant, and other physical
assets) are employed as collateral for loans. The bank managers prefer
issuing loans to local firms where verifying collateral is easy and past
customer experience can lower the risk of a default on a loan. About 9% of
total loans issued to the firms that borrow from more than one location are
dropped from the analysis.
The market is defined in this chapter according to the location of a
borrower with one central concentration of population or urban centre
including small locations at margin which in some way are economically
connected to the main market centre. The notion of market here is similar
to the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in North America with the
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exception of villages, as villages in Pakistan are also highly populated. In
the case of Pakistan, areas resembling MSAs are concentrated around a
large town, usually the capital of an administrative district. The large town
and district have the same name in most cases61. However, each district
has other towns and villages with a concentration of the population, but
varying amounts of economic activity. Therefore a market can be a village,
a town or a district capital depending on the location of the market and the
isolation of that market from surrounding markets.
The market for a loan can also be identified by the lender’s
corresponding bank branch. The information about bank name and branch
address is confidential in the CIB data, however a bank branch can be
uniquely identified by the bank-branch pair code, this information matched
with secondary information on total number of branches reveals that a
quarter of the total bank branches in the country report data to the CIB.
One potential reason for fewer reporting branches could be that the data
from non-reporting branches is reported by another branch (e.g. head
office) of the same bank. Therefore the borrower location is a better
candidate for designating a loan market than the bank branch location.
61 For example, capital of “District Lahore” is the city of Lahore. And the businesses
located in industrial belts around district towns are likely to be borrowing from banks in
various locations of Lahore
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3.4.1 Loans Sample and Discussion
In total there are 260,332 business loans reported in the CIB data
between 2006 and 2012 for 36,279 borrowing firms and 107 lending
institutions62 across 563 markets, Figure 3.1A in the appendix shows the
quarterly trend for number of loans. The number of loans declined after
2008, as monetary policy tightened and credit expansion was restricted by
banks. There is diversity in the nature of banks, particularly the products
that they offer to the consumers. About 76 % of loans are disbursed by
private banks, 4 government owned banks issue 10 % of loans, and 2
specialized banks command 7 % market share, the rest of the loans are
issued by a large number of small lending institutions (foot note 60). The
banks offer a variety of loan products for various business needs; the
majority of banks offer more than 10 different types of loans. There are
more than fifty types of product offered by banks, but in order to create
homogeneity in loan prices, for a given product, the number of products can
be reduced according to the nature of product. For example, loans can be
classified as working capital, and fixed capital loans. In addition, businesses
demand some products locally (e.g. to meet routine needs) so that the
62 In total forty six banks have been in operation during 2006 to 2012, the rest of the
lending institutions including small leasing companies and Islamic “modarabas” are
operational in large markets only. The analysis in main text based on data for the banks
only, some regressions in appendix are based on data for all lending institutions.
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competitive structure in a given location can potentially affect the price (i.e.
interest rate) for that product.
The loans are classified into sub categories; 46% of loans are
classified as working capital loans or credit lines, and firms usually generate
working capital locally as borrowing for the running finance is quite a
regular transaction for a business. Another 25 % of loans are based on
various specialized transactions related to foreign trade and foreign
investment, these loans are possibly issued by specific banks or bank
branches in large cities to companies engaged in importing and exporting
commodities, thereby the loan market becomes national for these types of
loans. In addition, 10 % of loans were disbursed for the fixed capital or the
equipment purchases including the lease based capital, and 7 % of loans
were issued to businesses related to farming. The disaggregation of loans
into different types is useful in order to estimate the price-concentration
relationship by nature of localization of product, and empirical
specifications can be estimated separately for various types of loans. In this
chapter working capital loans and loans disbursed for miscellaneous routine
activities63 (classified as “other type”) are employed in the empirical
analysis.
63 mainly physical capital and fixed capital loans
110
The key dependent variable, interest rate, is missing for more than
half of the reported loans in the CIB data. One possible reason64 for the
missing observation could be that banks are reporting the figure in
“KIBOR65-+premium %” format in the CIB system, this potentially creates
a problem as the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) might not be aware of the
corresponding KIBOR rate for each transaction which could result in
missing values. Although the CIB reports that either the interest rate was
not known at the time of reporting the data or the corresponding transaction
with missing interest rates are non-fund based loans (e.g. a bank guarantee).
The loan size distribution for the missing interest rate cases is quite similar
to the distribution of non-missing cases (appendix Figure 3.2A). Therefore
there is less of a chance that missing loan rate data might follow some
selection pattern.
Interest rate/loan size: Interest rate data appears to be of good
quality based on a consistency check presented in Figure 3.2, the trend in
the CIB reported interest rate follows the trend in the reported private sector
rate in published reports by the central bank. The average interest rate
during the sample period is 14 % with a standard deviation of 3.6. The trend
depicts monetary policy changes during the period with monetary tightening
64 confirmed in an interview with an anonymised bank manager
65 Karachi Interbank Offered Rate (KIBOR)
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since 2008 and a relatively steady interest rate period after 2009. The
average loan size is 69.4 million Pakistan Rupees66, with 75 % of loans less
than or equal to 40 million Rupees. Loan utilization can be determined by
the difference of outstanding loan and actual loan amount granted, both
variables can be observed in the CIB data, three quarters of loans have
utilized more than 50 % of the allocated loan limit.
Figure 3.2 Quarter wise average Nominal loan rate (%)
On the demand side, less than 5% of firms borrow from more than 5
banks at different times, while 75% of firms borrow from at most 1 bank,
and 90 % of loans are borrowed by private firms. The firms that borrow
from different banks over the years could be large conglomerates with better
access to credit markets. About 88 % of loans have a maturity date within
66 0.9 million US Dollars
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the sample period, and 95 % loans have about 4 years or less duration, the
median duration is 1 year 2 months67.
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for the variables used in regression
analysis
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Interest rate (%) 61044 14.56 3.08 3 20.7
Number of new banks in a market 61044 29.25 12.64 0 38
More than 5 banks dummy 61044 0.98 0.13 0 1
New private bank/lender dummy 61044 0.89 0.32 0 1
Number of total banks 61044 34.74 12.93 1 44
Loan Size (million Rupees) 61044 74.42 424.58 0.01 23328.9
Loan duration in months 61044 15.37 18.09 0 367
Private borrower dummy 61044 0.92 0.27 0 1
Notes: The sample is based on loans issued for working capital and loans used for multiple purposes including
fixed capital loans, the break up for two categories is give in appendix Table 3.2A.
In the light of the above discussion, the sample is restricted to loans
for working capital and for other routine services; including loans for fixed
capital, machinery and other physical capital. Loans for the farming
businesses and loans for the trade related activities are excluded from the
sample as both types of loans are concentrated in specific markets and
disbursed by the specialized banks. In addition, loans with a missing interest
rate are not used for the analysis because no imputation for the missing
interest rate can be made. The reduced sample includes 61,044 loans
67 The duration is calculated on the basis of loan issued date and loan maturity date, in some
cases loan maturity date is also loan extension date and for those cases average loan
duration will be longer than calculated here.
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reported by 39 banks in 302 markets over 25 quarters. Summary statistics
for main variables are given in Table 3.2.
3.5 Econometric Specification
The structure-performance hypothesis has been tested in previous
research on the banking industry using a simple econometric specification,
where the market concentration is treated as exogenous and other exogenous
controls are added to basic specification (Berger and Hannan 1989). The
fundamental idea is that the competition in a given market will affect loan
price or deposit rate, in the main model various concentration measures can
be employed to proxy competition in a given market. The basic
econometric specification presented in Berger and Hannan (1989) looks like
Model 3.1 below.
'
ijt ijt ijt ijtconc x ur       (3.1)
Where r is interest rate charged by bank i in market j during time period
t , conc is a measure of the market concentration, usually a Herfindahl
index or the 3 firm-ratio is used to proxy for the competition in the market,
and x is a vector of exogenous control variables, the coefficient of potential
interest here is  . For instance, a high market concentration will result in a
lower interest rate offered to depositors by the banks implying 0  . The
setting in Berger and Hannan (1989) tries to model the interest rate that a
bank offers for various deposits. While the loan data employed in this
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chapter corresponds more to what borrowers were paying for a particular
loan, depending on loan characteristics, borrower characteristics and market
characteristics, therefore in this case 0  in equation 3.1.
I have conceptualized the structure-performance hypothesis in two
models. In the first model, the key variable explaining variation in loan
prices according to the market competition is a dummy variable, where the
dummy takes the value of 1 if the market contains at least one bank other
than the large banks (BIG5)68. The cut off of “five banks” is used to separate
markets that only contain old large banks, from the markets that contain at
least one new private bank. This model is given in 3.2
1 0 0
'
1
5
(3 .2 )
i j t j i jt i j ti jt
i jt t i j ti j t
p r iva teB IG N E W d u rr
d u rsq u a re lo a n t
    
   
    
   
The Model 3.2 controls for the nature of a firm’s ownership where (private)
is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the loan was issued to a private firm,
duration of loan (dur), and size of loan (loan), further quarterly dummies
vector (t) is included to control for time variation, while variable NEW takes
value of 1 if the lending bank is a private bank69.
The nature of competition in different markets is not known here and
it is not clear how the five large incumbents compete with new entrants, so
68 The large old banks mainly five banks, number of branches given in foot note 54
69 Complete list of dependent variable, exogenous variable and controls are given in
Appendix Table 3.4A
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the selection of a concentration measure or cut-off based on the number of
banks in a given market may become arbitrary. As discussed earlier, before
liberalization five government-owned banks were dominating the banking
industry in Pakistan and during reforms started in 1990s, four of these banks
were privatised. There was also an issuance of licences to new private
banks. The competition in a location can be viewed as the presence of
private banks other than large old banks70 in the market as presented in
model 3.2. But intuitively, competition in a market increases with the
presence of any additional bank; including fringe banks, as the regulator has
set a level playing field for all banks in the industry. Therefore model 3.2 is
modified with the inclusion of a number of total new banks in the market.
The quadratic form is assumed in the Model 3.3 given below where BANK
is the number of new banks in a given market.
2 1 211 2
'
3 1 1
2
(3 .3 )
i j t j j i j ti j ti j t
i j t t i j ti j t
N E W p r iv a teB A N K B A N K d u rr
d u r s q u a r e lo a n t u
   
  
      
  
In equation 3.3, market concentration is measured by the number of new
private banks (BANK) in the market. The important assumption here is that
the numbers of banks in a market are predetermined and this assumption is
supported by the fact that entry and exit in the banking industry in Pakistan
between 2006 and 2012 was quite negligible. Although in the latter part of
70 The summary statistics in Table 1 shows 98 % loans are issued in markets that contain at
least one bank other than large old banks, so the result in specifications using 5BIG
should be taken with caution.
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the sample, the number of banks goes down, probably because of closure or
the merger of small banks, as these banks were struggling to maintain strict
reserve capital requirements introduced under banking regulation. However,
the CIB data shows that the small banks were mainly operating in very large
markets with little effect on market structure, in most of medium and small
markets. The models 3.2 and 3.3 can be estimated by Ordinary Least Square
(OLS), although standard errors need to be adjusted for the source of
variation in data and preferably clustered at market level, the estimation and
results are discussed in the next section.
3.6 Results and Discussion
In this section, the price-concentration specifications 3.2 and 3.3 are
estimated by pooled OLS for the samples of working capital loans and
multiple purpose loans. The selection of one specific loan category into a
subsample will be useful to group loan type according to the nature of the
market for that specific product. For example, working capital is required to
maintain routine business activities and borrowed in the local markets. The
estimates are based on OLS while clustered standard errors are estimated for
statistical inference (i.e. clustered at market level). For robustness checks,
linear and quadratic functional forms (in terms of BANK variable) for
equation 3.3 are estimated after controlling for independent variables, the
results are given in Table 3.3.
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The linear and quadratic functional form results for Model 3.3 are
given in column (1) and (2) of Table 3.3 respectively, while results for
Model 3.2 are given in column (3) of Table 3.3. In the linear functional form
of Model 3.3, the coefficient for the BANK variable measures the effect of
the number of banks in the market on average interest rate. The OLS
estimated coefficient on BANK reported in column (1) of Table 3.3 shows
that loan price for working capital declines by 2.7 basis points71 with the
availability of an additional bank in the market72. This statistically
significant finding is consistent with the notion that market concentration in
a given market is positively associated with the interest rate (the banks
charge to businesses in that market). The average effect of an additional
bank in the market on working capital loans declines to 1 basis point when a
quadratic functional form is employed for estimating equation 3.3, the linear
and quadratic BANK terms are jointly significant in column (2) of Table 3.3
for the working capital loans. In the case of multiple purpose loans, the
estimation of a linear function shows that on average, the loan rate decreases
by 3 basis points with the addition of one more bank in the market. However
this effect is not statistically significant when quadratic functional form is
used.
71 1 basis point ( bp) is equal to 1/100th of 1%
72 The average presence of other competing banks in a market is based on observed Credit
Information Bureau data that does not include banks which were present in the market but
were not engaged in issuing business loans during 2006 to 2012.
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Other estimated coefficients in column (1) and column (2) of Table
3.3 are in line with the corresponding economic intuition that interest rate
increases with loan duration, where loan rate is the lowest for 5 year
duration loans for working capital and 8 year duration loans for multiple
purpose loans. The interest rate declines with the loan size, on average the
interest rate declines by 2 basis points with an increase in loan size of 10 %
for working capital loans (0.8 basis points for multipurpose loan). The
private banks charge a lower loan rate than government owned banks and
the results are significant for the working capital loans sample73, where the
average gap is above 80 basis points. This potentially has two implications,
first, the lower price charged by private banks is consistent with efficient
structure and lower cost of the private banks, and second, the competition
will be higher in the markets where private banks are present. The
coefficient for private borrower dummy is significant for working capital
loans, where on average the private firms pay 34 basis point higher loan rate
than government enterprises, but significance declines as borrower and
lender interaction terms are incorporated.
Specifications in column (3) of Table 3.3 are based on model 3.2,
where 5BIG is a dummy variable separating markets containing at least
one new private bank from the markets with only large old banks. Although
73 The effect of private bank dummy cannot estimated for multiple purpose due to
collinearity with some of interaction terms
119
arbitrariness cannot be ruled out in the selection of the 5BIG , but
institutional facts support the inclusion of the intercept shift through the
5BIG in model 3.2. The five major government banks in the Pakistani
banking industry have dominated the loan market over the years (Mahmood
2009), these are the large banks of the country, with a wide network of
branches, and the liberalization reforms exposed these banks to competition
from new private local and foreign banks by the late 1990s. The 5BIG are
capturing the exposure of the market to new competing banks, and
comparing markets with new banks to markets with old large banks, the
downside of this variable is that only a few markets contain just large old
banks, the mean of indicator variable 5BIG is 0.98. However, the estimated
coefficient on BIG5 is statistically significant and shows that borrowers in
markets containing at least one new bank pay 27 basis points lower interest
rate for working capital and 152 basis points lower interest rate for multiple
purpose loans, compared to markets containing only large old banks.
The competitive structure of the banking industry is influenced by
the operation of the conventional banks in most of the markets across the
country, but the CIB data shows that other small financial institutions
including Islamic finance companies and leasing companies are also lending
to corporate borrowers mainly located in large cities. In order to incorporate
the competitive effect of other financial institutions, model 3.2 and 3.3 are
estimated for the sample of loans for all financial institutions, the results are
120
presented in appendix Table 3.3A. The findings that loan rate decreases with
the increase in the number of banks in a market is present in various
specifications in appendix Table 3.3A, where total number of lending
institutions is used to proxy BANK variable instead of number of
conventional banks. The relationship between number of banks and loan
price remains statistical significant in Table 3.3A.
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Table 3.3 Pooled regression results for the effect of concentration on loan rates
Working Capital Interest Rate Multiple Purpose Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Number of new Banks -0.027*** 0.029 -0.034*** -0.075
(0.005) (0.021) (0.007) (0.044)
Squared number of Banks -0.001* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
BIG5 dummy -0.268 -1.524***
(0.278) (0.37)
Private Bank Dummy -0.841** -0.838** -1.102**
(0.274) (0.276) (0.338)
Private Borrower Dummy -0.154 -0.171 -0.23 -0.455 -0.401 -0.747
(0.181) (0.189) (0.189) (0.546) (0.544) (0.543)
Log Loan Amount -0.245*** -0.239*** -0.291*** -0.080** -0.079** -0.080***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.048) (0.025) (0.025) (0.023)
Loan Duration 0.026** 0.026** 0.028** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.037***
-0.009 (0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Public Borrower* Private Bank -1.620** -1.620** -2.167***
(0.598) (0.601) (0.619)
Private Borrower* Private Bank 0.554* 0.553* 0.705** -0.669*** -0.725** -0.869***
(0.257) (0.261) (0.272) (0.200) (0.223) (0.159)
Constant -20.950*** -21.300*** -19.842*** -21.299*** -20.819*** -17.198***
(1.775) (1.727) (1.777) (2.751) (2.734) (2.348)
Sample Size 43363 43363 43363 7317 7317 7317
R Square 0.771 0.771 0.767 0.718 0.718 0.714
NOTES: dependant variable real interest rate annual %, results based on pooled sample 2006-2012, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at market level, quadratic loan
duration terms are included in all specifications, further quarter dummies included in all specifications. ). R-square for all models is between 0.71 to 0.77, further Ramsey RESET reject the null hypothesis that
models have no omitted variables in most of the specifications.
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Most of other the coefficients in Table 3.3A are not much different from
Table 3.3, although the coefficient of a private lender dummy is higher in magnitude,
particularly for multiple purpose loans, this is likely because smaller financial
institutions are mostly issuing fixed capital loans that fall under the multiple loan
category. For example, the coefficient in column (3) of Table 3.3A for multiple
purpose loans shows that private financial institutions charge borrowers 120 basis
points lower interest rate compared to government banks, holding other factors
constant. The nature of competition between small financial institutions and large
banks is not clear, however the CIB data shows that small institutions are mainly
leasing companies and Islamic finance companies. The analysis incorporated
additional interaction terms for lender type and borrower type for public and private
market segments, however majority of results are insignificant, although there is
some evidence that for multiple purpose loans government companies get loans from
private bank at lower rates compared to what private banks offer to private
borrowers.
In the markets where historically large banks are operational competition is
neutralized due to long customer relation between big 5 banks and borrowers (i.e.
brand loyalty). As before liberalization, most of the businesses were financed by the
big 5 banks in virtually all the markets of Pakistan, there is a high probability that the
client relationship between firms and banks carried on, particularly in the local
markets where no post reforms entry occurred. In credit markets with long customer
relationships, banks can charge marginally higher rates to old customers as switching
costs might be higher, while new borrowers/firms in large cities can take advantage
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of competition in the market and switch to the bank with the lower interest rate for
business financing74.
The regression result supports the idea that competitive structure influences
market prices, the loan rate declines as the number of banks increases in a market.
Although the statistical evidence goes in favour of the structure conduct hypothesis,
the findings are not robust to the functional forms as demonstrated in Table 3.3 and
Table 3.3A. The weak statistical relationship between market structure and prices
potentially results from issues with the description of the market variable, some
institutional details, and the nature of the Credit Information Bureau (CIB) data, the
discussion below covers two such aspects. One possible solution is to check
sensitivity of results by employing different measures of concentration. There is
limitation to select other measures of concentration, because the other measures of
market concentration are available at aggregate level over the sample period, while
loans are reported quarterly, so the additional concentration measure might not
capture the actual impact of market concentration on the loan rate. The empirical
model can improve by incorporating the impact of entry of high level player into the
market, but the required information is not available in the Credit Information
Bureau (CIB) data, the main source of analysis is the CIB
First, the identification of a geographical market is based on the borrower’s
address as the branch details are confidential in the Credit Information Bureau data75,
and most borrowers reported their main region as the location rather than the detailed
street level address. Therefore there is some risk that a loan was actually generated
by a bank located in a market with a high bank concentration, while the loan was
74 This notion is reconfirmed with an unstructured qualitative interview with a leading bank manager.
75 The branch information might not be very useful in identifying market location as well (see Section
3.4).
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reported in the CIB system for an urban market according to the main address, and in
that market many banks were in operation. This data reporting issue can potentially
dilute the influence of the competitive structure of the banking market on interest
rates charged by a bank for a given loan in that market.
Finally, in a large informal economy such as Pakistan, most businesses are
owned by unregistered firms or firms with single person liability, particularly family
or individual owned small firms in the local markets which are usually unregistered
firms76. The CIB data reports loans only for organized large firms including listed
companies, and large corporations (See Figure 3.3A). The variation in borrowing
cost for credit is likely to be higher for small businesses across different markets,
where borrowing cost depends on the nature of competition in the market. As Credit
Information Bureau data only covers established firms and does not includes single
person liability firm, so the effect of banking concentration on business loans cannot
be estimated for all types of firms in the market. The single liability business loans
are classified as personal loans in the CIB data. For further research, enlarging the
sample of loans by including single liability firms can provide further insight into the
analysis of the structure-conduct hypothesis for the loan market in Pakistan.
3.7 Concluding Remarks and Further Research
This chapter estimates the price concentration relationship for the Pakistani
banking industry. It bridges an important gap as there is no substantial empirical
literature available on competition and market outcomes of the baking industry in
Pakistan at a micro level. The simple model estimated here shows that the interest
rate charged by banks decreases as the number of banks grows in a market, and the
76 Including farming, transport, trade, retail services, and many other small scale activities.
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loan price is substantially less in the markets where post liberalization entry has
occurred.
The structure performance hypothesis explains results from one dimension,
where the concentration and competitive banking structure in a market is affecting
the loan rate banks charge to borrowers. The banking efficiency literature shows that
new private banks are operating efficiently in the Pakistani banking industry that
means low cost entrants are crating competitive pressure for large old incumbents.
However the post liberalization private bank entry occurred mostly in large cities, so
it might by the case that the cost of the banks in small-town markets is higher
compared to large cities, due to overheads that will confound the influence of
competition on price with the cost of banking.
On the policy front, the central bank of Pakistan has encouraged banks to
open branches in small towns and local markets in recent years, as the major post
liberalization entry occurred only in large cities, urban centres, and industrial towns.
But before any policy prescription can be laid, the logical question emerges of what
determines the number of banks in a given market? And, what factors are important
for a bank to decide entry in or exit from the market? These are important research
questions which will help policy makers, and future research should be directed in
this line.
The data constructed in this chapter can be of potential use for the further
research in order to address policy evaluation questions in the banking industry, or in
measuring the impact of any exogenous shock in financial markets. For example, the
evaluation of any exogenous shocks during the sample period including weather
catastrophes on the lending market can be studied with this data. Similarly, market
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changes which can simulate natural experiments can be matched with the data set
constructed here to address policy relevant questions.
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3.8 Data Appendix
Table 3.1A: Credit Information Bureau (CIB) selected variables
 Lending Institution Code, unique bank identifier
 Borrower's Code, unique firm identifier
 Borrower’s location City, Town or District
 Name of credit facility, type of loan (e.g. working capital)
 Date on which the credit facility was given to the borrower
 Nature of facility (e.g. fund based, non- fund based)
 Maturity date, or renewal date of the credit facility in case credit line is renewed
 Limit amount of the credit facility in Rupees
 Principal outstanding amount against the facility including interest rate in Rupees
 Nature and value (in Rupees) of collateral against the loan facility provided by the bank
 Interest rate at charged for the loan (Annual Percentage Rate - APR )
 Borrower’s credit rating if available , including internal and external rating
Source: Credit Information Bureau, State Bank of Pakistan
Table 3.2A: Summary Statistics Group wise
Variable Observations Mean StandardDeviation Min Max
Loans for multiple purposes
Interest rate (%) 7317 14.20 3.46 3 20.68
Number of new banks in a market 7317 26.56 14.12 0 38
More than 5 banks dummy 7317 0.97 0.16 0 1
New private bank/lender dummy 7317 0.79 0.41 0 1
Number of total banks 7317 31.97 14.51 1 44
Loan Size (million Rupees) 7317 120.19 839.10 0.01 23327.97
Loan duration in months 7317 15.54 22.22 0 170
Working Capital
Interest rate (%) 43363 14.45 3.04 3 20.68
Number of new banks in a market 43363 28.37 13.06 0 38
More than 5 banks dummy 43363 0.98 0.14 0 1
New private bank/lender dummy 43363 0.90 0.30 0 1
Number of total banks 43363 33.84 13.34 1 44
Loan Size (million Rupees) 43363 64.98 289.81 0.01 22820
Loan duration in months 43363 9.97 9.86 0 240
128
Table 3.3A: Pooled regression results all financial institutions for the effect of concentration on loan rates
Dependent Variable Working Capital Interest Rate Multiple Purpose Interest Rate
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Number of new Banks -0.011*** -0.001 -0.007** -0.041**
(0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.015)
BIG5 dummy -0.890** -0.890** -0.466* -1.485*** -1.462*** -1.569***
(0.283) (0.284) (0.216) (0.29) (0.29) (0.378)
Private Bank Dummy -0.187 -0.202 -1.124*** 0.27 0.335 -1.597***
(0.182) (0.187) (0.316) (0.50) (0.500) (0.295)
Private Borrower Dummy -0.236*** -0.236*** -0.207 -0.120*** -0.115*** 0.225
(0.042) (0.042) (0.170) (0.033) (0.033) (0.518)
Log Loan Amount 0.027** 0.027** -0.289*** 0.039** 0.039** -0.117***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.048) (0.013) (0.013) (0.031)
Loan Duration 0.027** 0.027** 0.029** 0.039** 0.039** 0.036**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Private Borrower * Private Bank 0.565* 0.572* 0.685** 0.204 0.14 0.265
(0.276) (0.280) (0.260) (0.332) (0.328) (0.353)
Constant -21.234*** -21.276*** -19.812*** -27.276*** -27.046*** -24.416***
(1.751) (1.749) (1.719) (3.706) (3.699) (3.217)
Sample Size 43719 43719 43719 8349 8349 8349
R Square 0.772 0.772 0.768 0.728 0.729 0.727
NOTES: for dependant variable real interest rate annual %, results based on pooled sample 2006-2012, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses clustered at market level), quadratic loan
duration terms are included in all specifications, quadratic BANK term included in specification (2). R-square for all models is between 0.73 to 0.77, further Ramsey RESET reject the null hypothesis that models
have no omitted variables in most of the specifications.
129
Figure 3.1A: Number of Loans (quarter wise)
Figure 3.2A: Kernel Densities for Log Loans (2006-2012)
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Table 3.4A: Description of variables used in regression analysis
Acronym Variable Description
r Interest rate (%) Inter rate charged for each loan
Number of new Banks Number of new banks in a market Number of total private bank entered and operating in the
market after liberalization
BIG5 Dummy More than 5 banks dummy Takes the value 1 if loan is issued in a market where at least one
bank other than the large banks operate
Private Bank Dummy New private bank/lender dummy Takes value of 1 if the loan is issued by a private bank and 0
otherwise
Loan Amount Loan Size (million Rupees) Amount of loan in local currency
Loan Duration Loan duration in months Loan contract duration in months
Private Borrower Dummy Private borrower dummy Takes value of 1 if loan is issued to a private firm, and 0 if a
government owned firm
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Figure 3.3A: Types of Borrowers
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